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                                                       Abstract 
Exclusionary acts are acts by a dominant firm that impede or prevent other firms 
from entering into, or expanding within a market. A key problem that South Africa 
and other competition authorities face is that all competition is exclusionary. Every 
low price or innovation impedes other firms from entering into or expanding within a 
market. The critical question is: how does one distinguish between well-functioning 
competition and a malfunctioning one? This issue has generated a lot of research to 
obtain a suitable test to answer this question. The tests adopted in both the USA and 
the EU jurisdictions are discussed in light of the test adopted in South Africa in the 
Competition Commission v South African Airways case. This thesis cautions against 
the wholesale adoption of USA and EU jurisprudence in South Africa considering 
the unique public interest objectives of the Competition Act of South Africa. This 
thesis acknowledges that competition law is still foreign to African economies and 
makes the argument for the adoption of competition law on a regional level to police 
the largely unregulated African market where cartels are free to engage in 
exclusionary practices at will and national governments lack the resources or will to 
adopt competition law on a national level. This thesis studies the extraterritorial 
application of competition law in the EU and USA to advance the argument that if 
competition laws are adopted as already done in COMESA on a regional level, such 
laws can function effectively using the extraterritoriality rule. This thesis goes 
further using the South African Competition Act to attempt to balance and justify the 
traditional efficiency goals of competition law with public interest goals which most 
developing countries will also attempt to incorporate into any competition law to be 
adopted.  
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                                                     Chapter 1 
                                                    Introduction 
1.1. Background 
      Competition Law is governed by empowering legislation. Legislation in most 
developing and third world economies are mostly fashioned after the existing 
framework of legislation originating from the European Union (EU) or the United 
States of America (USA). While a lot of these pieces of legislation are often 
modified to suit the needs of these developing countries, it is usually not the case that 
a cautious approach is taken to ensure that imported legislation is designed to meet 
the specific national challenges of such a country. The Courts in most jurisdictions 
especially in the USA and the EU have attempted to deal with the lapse in 
competition legislations by giving landmark decisions on significant issues like 
dominant firms and their unilateral exclusionary behaviors. The big question to 
consider in this dissertation is how competition laws should apply to dominant firms. 
This question has raised much interest in recent years. Aside from establishing which 
firms have substantial market power that can harm competition, there have been 
difficulties in distinguishing competition on the merits from mere anticompetitive 
conduct. This is more obvious in the case of unilateral exclusionary behaviors and 
will be the central focus in this dissertation. 
 
1.2. Statement of Research Problem 
      Unilateral behaviors adopted by dominant firms are called exclusionary because 
they aim at discouraging potential rivals' entry into the relevant market or, 
conversely, they intend to gradually drive existing competitors off the market.1
      The fact that exclusionary conduct does not always lead to a straightforward 
lessening of consumer welfare makes the overall assessment of the anticompetitive 
 In 
other words, exclusionary conduct is directly aimed at competitors, and only by 
damaging the latter does it cause a lessening of competition that ultimately damages 
consumers.  
                                                          
1 John Marshall ‘Intellectual Property Rights at the Crossroad between Monopolization and Abuse of 
Dominant Position: American and European Approaches Compared’ (2007) 24 J.Marshall J. 
Computer & Info.L. 455 at 2. 
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character of the conduct more complex.2 In particular, because the ultimate effects of 
the conduct on consumers is not always immediate, consumers may not immediately 
bear a higher price or will not face a sudden shortening of quantities. There is a 
sensible risk that the anticompetitive harm stemming from exclusionary conduct may 
be underestimated which raises the question of the effect of exclusionary conduct on 
public interest.3 This is especially significant when consideration is given to the 
American approach which allows dominant firms to defend themselves by asserting 
that their conduct did not have the effect of harming consumers. The European 
Commission bodies on competition on the other hand regard consumer welfare as an 
important goal of competition policy and presume consumer damage where the 
distortion of competition is caused by the presence of a dominant firm on a market 
and is brought a step further by an abusive conduct but they insist that protecting 
competition as an institution should remain the main priority of competition law.4
      Both the European Commission and the USA also have competition rules that 
have extraterritorial application and it will be interesting to evaluate their 
extraterritorial application in light of growing calls in developing countries that 
competition law should be governed by regional competition agreements as a more 
effective tool in policing multinational corporations. 
  
      The American and European Union approach to exclusionary conduct and their 
approach to the question of extraterritoriality and public interest are significant in 
discussing which approach will be best suited for developing economies. However, 
this analysis can only be successful if it is contextualized because contextualization 
is the basis of law. This dissertation will therefore aim to address the issue of 
exclusionary conduct in abuse of dominance using decided cases from the USA and 
the EU. How these foreign jurisdictions have addressed the issue of public interest 
will also be assessed when discussing the difficulty South Africa faces in considering 
public interest issues in competition cases and how they are important for enterprise 
development in developing countries and the balance of traditional efficiency goals.   
 
 
                                                          
2 Ibid. 
3 John Marshall (note 1) at 2. 
4 Ibid. 
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1.3. Scope and Objectives 
The objectives of this dissertation are as follows: 
1. A brief look at the legislative background of the four key legislation relevant 
to these dissertation and introductory discussion of the relevance and 
advantages of competition law in promoting economic development and 
efficiency to serve as a foundation to the broader discussion of regulating 
exclusionary practices of dominant firms through competition law.  
2. An analysis of s 8 of the South African Competition Act on the concept of 
exclusionary practices in abuse of dominant positions. The American 
Sherman Act and the European Commission Treaty Art. 82 will be first 
discussed to highlight the significant similarities and differences between the 
American and European approaches which are the most successful 
competition authorities in the world and how they may be useful in 
interpreting s 8 of the Competition Act of South Africa.  
3. A discussion of the extraterritorial application of abuse of dominance rules in 
both the EU and the USA and the possibility of using this principle to 
advance the argument that regional competition agreements should govern 
competition law in Africa.  
4. In a final analysis, I will consider how the public interest factor affects 
competition authorities in their decision making on exclusionary behaviours. 
I will again use South Africa as a case study where public interest is not only 
of vital importance to ensure economic growth but also a requirement in the 
Competition Act and how an equitable balance can be achieved between 
traditional competition goals of efficiency and public interest objectives. 
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1.4 Legislative Background 
      Four key pieces of legislation are crucial to the analysis in this dissertation. 
Below is a brief background of these pieces of legislation to ensure a holistic 
understanding of the discussion that takes place later on.  
 
1.4.1 The United States (US) Sherman Act 
      The US pioneered competition law or antitrust law, as it is known in the US in 
the true sense. In the period after the American civil war productive capacity in 
America increased at a blistering pace but this also led to destructive boom and bust 
cycles and consequently a greater concentration of control of the economy into fewer 
hands.5 Large American Corporations in the late 19th century used business trusts 
controlling interests in multiple corporations to conceal the true nature of their 
business arrangements. Big trusts came to be viewed as disguises for big monopolies. 
These perceived threats to democracy and free market values led to the enactment of 
the Sherman Act of 1890. The Sherman Act alongside other legislation became the 
most important tools in the US Competition law arsenal. The Sherman Act is widely 
formulated and it leaves much to the imagination of the courts.6 The movement that 
agitated for regulation of these combinations was anti-trust and the body of law that 
developed in its wake in the United States is still known as antitrust law.7
      The economists of the period believed that free competition that did not restrict 
the free exercise of trade but provided the fairest and the best economic system and 
this perception informed the politics of the time.
  
8 It was accepted that free 
competition in general would also promote efficiency.9 In 1914 the law was further 
strengthened by the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act.10
                                                          
5 William H Page ‘Ideological conflict and the origins of antitrust policy’ (1991) 1 Tulane Law Review 
at 31–33. 
 These 
acts were intended to fill perceived gaps in the Sherman Act. These prohibitions 
were intended at ensuring access to markets, particularly for the small firms. The 
6 Lawrence Reyburn & Philip Sutherland Competition Act Commentary Lexis Nexis Butterworths 
Chapter 2 para 2.4. 
7 Ibid. 
8 James May ‘Antitrust in the formative era: political and economic theory in constitutional and 
antitrust analysis 1880–1918’ 1989 Ohio State Law Journal 257at 270. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Reyburn and Sutherland (note 6). 
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regulatory body in terms of the Act is the Federal Trade Commission and the 
Department of Justice is the enforcement body.  
1.4.2 European Commission (EC) Competition Law Treaty 
      After the second world war several western European states which had been on 
different sides during the war decided to converge on an economic level in an 
attempt to create a peaceful Europe and to prevent the rising soviet communism of 
the time.11
      In Europe there has been much less of an ideological debate about the nature and 
goals of competition law than in the US.
 A relationship between anti competitive practices of firms was linked to 
the economic instability taking place in the region. The goal of establishing a single 
market emerged as a solution to these problems and unified competition rules was 
essential to achieving this. Three regulatory bodies are central to the implementation 
of the treaty. They are the National Competition Authorities of member states, the 
European Competition Commission, and the European Competition Network which 
facilitates decisions on allocation of cases to national or community authorities. 
Judicial review takes place with Court of First Instance of the European 
Communities and the European Court of Justice. European competition law shares 
many traits with antitrust law in the United States but it also differs in some respects.  
12 Initially huge emphasis was placed on the 
market integration goal of European competition law but competition law in Europe 
is moving towards an approach that focuses more on the protection of consumers and 
economic efficiency.13 As in the United States, competition law in Europe operates 
on two levels. The member states have their own competition law systems to deal 
with more localised competition problems, however, the European Competition law 
system operates supra-nationally.14
 
 This allows the Commission to address anti-
competitive practices of governments to a much greater extent than in the United 
States. 
 
 
                                                          
11 Ibid at para 2.5. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
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1.4.3 South Africa’s Competition Act 89 of 1998 
      The key economic objectives of the African National Congress (ANC) before the 
first democratic elections in South Africa were set out in its Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) in 1994.15 It listed some of the economic and social 
ills that could be traced back to economic concentration and proposed strict antitrust 
legislation to create a more competitive economic environment.16 It recommended 
legislation to address economic concentration, interlocking directorships, and anti-
competitive practices such as market domination and abuse.17 After the ANC came 
into power, the government published its proposed guidelines for competition policy 
to flesh out these broad policies. Anti-competitive conduct, abuses of dominances 
and mergers which do not serve the public interest, as well as ownership 
concentrations leading to excessive control over economic activity were to be 
addressed.18
      In 1998 the Department of Trade followed up this document by publishing the 
Competition Bill. The explanatory memorandum to the Act confirmed that South 
African markets were concentrated which were the cause of many problems, and 
most importantly that it undermined the market system itself, but that previous 
legislation was inadequate in addressing these difficulties.
  
19 The overriding objective 
of the Act is the promotion of competition in order to underpin economic efficiency 
and adaptability, international competitiveness, the market access of small, medium 
and micro enterprises, diversification of ownership in favour of members of 
historically disadvantaged communities, and the creation of new employment 
opportunities.20
      The legislation provides for a right of appeal from the decisions of the 
Competition Tribunal to a specially constituted judicial authority, the Competition 
Appeal Court. The Competition Tribunal and the Competition Appeal Court have 
sole jurisdiction over competition matters with some exceptions. One of the 
  
                                                          
15 Lawrence Reyburn & Philip Sutherland Competition Act Commentary Lexis Nexis Butterworths 
Chapter 3 para 3.2.3. 
16 Supra. 
17Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
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exceptions relates to the civil courts’ responsibility for calculating the quantum of 
damages.  
 
1.4.4 The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) 
Competition Regulations 
      Although intra COMESA trade had increased considerably as a result of the 
COMESA trading arrangement, it is common knowledge that developing countries 
have not achieved the expected results in terms of integration into the global market 
to compete with developed countries.21 Through privatisation programmes launched 
with the World Bank Structural Adjustment Programmes, most African economies 
moved from economies led by state owned monopolies to private sector monopolies. 
With trading arrangements established through regional economic organisations such 
as COMESA, these private sector monopolies normally foreign owned, transcended 
national boundaries to become regional monopolies as trans-national corporations.22
      As a result of a lack of competition policy and legislation at national and regional 
levels, the business environment in developing countries such as COMESA member 
states did not ensure equity and fairness through a predictable and level playing 
field.
  
23
 
 The experience of developing countries showed that trade liberalisation and 
privatisation alone cannot be relied upon to bring about fair competition. The 
founding members of COMESA had foreseen the need for free and fair competition 
and to this effect made provision for free and fair competition in Article 55 of the 
COMESA Treaty. The provision prohibits anti-competitive practices and also makes 
provisions for regulations to be enacted to regulate competition within member 
States.  
 
 
 
                                                          
21Brian Chigawa, Competition Policy Conference, Available at 
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/fias.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/Conferences_CompetitionPolicyTanz_Brian+C
higawa.prn.pdf/$FILE/Conferences_CompetitionPolicyTanz_Brian+Chigawa.prn.pdf (accessed 18th 
June 2009) pg 2. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
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1.5. Relevance of Competition Law in Promoting Economic Development 
      Much like the developed countries, developing countries are riddled with cartels 
and other restraints that obstruct the markets and hurt the people.24 Globalization has 
lowered barriers to trade and paved the way to efficiency benefits from markets. It is 
argued that liberalization and competition law should work hand in hand to anchor 
these benefits.25 A number of advocates of the developing world believe that 
globalization tends to increase the disparity of wealth and opportunity to the 
disadvantage of some of the poorest people.26 In some developing countries, it made 
many producers worse off as their exported commodities faced competition in world 
markets and value-added tariffs for import and export became high.27 If competition 
law in developing countries widens the inequality moat rather than build the mobility 
ladder, then the question whether free-market competition law should be advocated 
for the developing world requires serious re-consideration.28
      One of the arguments is that in developing countries, deregulation and open trade 
are sufficient to force competition on domestic markets.
 Further arguments have 
been expressed by a number of policy makers and economists about the relevance of 
competition policy for economic development or cautioned against the dangers of 
using tools adapted to the environment of developed countries in developing 
countries.  
1 This argument is premised 
on the belief that the absence of competition law does not necessarily lead to an anti-
competitive trading environment. Frederic Jenny, a competition law expert counters 
this argument and states that in both developed and developing countries, 
competition law can be a useful complement to deregulation policies because these 
policies may in themselves be insufficient to bring about the expected benefits in 
terms of the promotion of efficiency.29
                                                          
24 Eleanor Fox: ‘Economic Development, Poverty and Anti-Trust: The Other Path’ (2007) 13 Sw. J.L 
& Trade in Americas pg 105. 
 He states that if the effects of international 
competition are not felt, privatization and deregulation may lead to undue 
25 Ibid. 
26 Jeffrey D. Sachs, Globalization and Patterns of Economic Growth, in Globalization: What’s New? 
(Michael W. Weinstein ed., 2005) 214. 
27 Ralph Kaplinsky ‘Globalization, Poverty and Inequality: Between a Rock and a Hard Place’ 2005 at 
57. 
28 Marshall (note 1) at 110. 
29 Frederic Jenny ‘Globalization, Competition and Trade Policy: Convergence, Divergence and 
Cooperation’ Conference Paper sponsored by the University of Oklahoma College of Law and Center 
for Global Partnership. Pg 8.12. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty
of 
Ca
pe
 To
13 
 
concentration in the hands of a few wealthy individuals and the lack of competition 
thereby defeating market-opening measures associated with trade liberalization.30
      A second argument is that the usefulness of domestic competition laws in 
developing countries may not outweigh the harm by multinational corporations who 
use such laws as a Trojan horse to destroy the national economies of developing 
countries.
 
31 This raises the issue of the limitations of domestic competition laws to 
solve problems raised by cross-border anti-competitive practices. Jenny argues that it 
is because some countries do not have domestic competition law that they become 
prime victims of transnational anticompetitive practices.32 He argues that it is clear 
that international anti-competitive practices by multinationals can prevent economic 
development and failure by developing countries to have adequate means to fight 
such practices exposes them to significant setbacks on the road to economic 
development.33
      Other arguments against the adoption of competition laws by developing 
countries are that the cost of adopting such laws may turn out to be larger than the 
expected benefits and competition laws in developing countries could be misused 
and lead to undue bureaucratic control over market mechanisms.
  
34 This may be so 
because most developing countries may not have the resources to enforce 
complicated competition policies or the policies do not address the specific problems 
of economic development but is rather focused on socio-political goals rather than 
purely economic goals.35
      Despite the scepticisms expressed above, there are various advantages of 
competition law for developing economies which are discussed next. 
 This argument can however be easily countered by 
advocating for independent competition authorities to regulate the market and to 
engineer processes that would prevent undue interference with market mechanisms 
and as will be shown later in this paper, a country has a right to make a choice to 
balance both economic and socio-political goals in their competition rules.  
 
                                                          
30 Ibid at 8.13. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid at 8.17. 
33 Ibid at 8.18. 
34 Ibid at 8.14-8.16. 
35 Ibid. 
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1.6. Advantages of Competition Law for Developing Countries 
      For any country to have an efficient competition law, the government, public and 
business sector must appreciate the benefits of competition. Although some 
economists are of the view that the advantages of competition are obvious, players in 
transitional economies are hesitant to the idea of competitive markets for many 
reasons including the fear of losing their dominance and monopolization in the 
market economy. Two major advantages of Competition law in a free market 
economy are identifiable and briefly discussed. 
      The first advantage concerns maintaining price competition and eliminating 
output or entry restrictions, in other words, ensuring lower prices and higher 
quality.36 Maintaining competition is perhaps the most familiar role of competition 
law. Competition law prohibits anti-competitive behaviour such as price fixing and 
market divisions. By eliminating such behaviours, the effect of competition law will 
be to reduce consumer costs on the purchase of goods and services plus a much 
wider range of choices within a specific product.37 It will also force producers to 
constantly improve their products and to make them cheaper. If they do not innovate 
and their rivals do, then they will cease to be in business.38
      A second advantage is promoting social mobility and social cohesion.
 
39 This is 
one of the most important aspects of free market for developing economies. The 
concept of domestic competition has enormous social and legal implications and 
governments cannot expect to achieve the objectives of competition such as lower 
prices and higher quality without reducing domestic barriers to entry.40 They must 
facilitate the formation of new firms to challenge the dominance of old ones.41 This 
will result in the creation of new entrepreneurs and more jobs, which would allow 
more people to invest in the development of economic institutions and social 
stability.42
                                                          
36 Kenneth Davidson ‘Creating Effective Competition Institutions: Ideas for Transitional Economies’ 
(2005) 6 APLPJ at 79 
  
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid pg 80. 
39 Ibid pg 83. 
40 Ibid pg 84. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid pg 85. 
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      From the discussion above, it is quite obvious that Competition law in the 21st
            
 
century is highly significant for developing countries and the discussion that follows 
below is important in shaping the future of Competition law specifically in the 
context of unilateral exclusionary practices in abuse of dominant positions in South 
Africa with lessons from the EU and USA. 
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                                                     Chapter 2 
           Exclusionary Conduct in Abuse of Dominance under the EU and U.S 
      The aim of this chapter is to discuss different approaches to exclusionary conduct 
of dominant companies. It will be most appropriate to compare different approaches 
using the jurisprudence of American and European Competition law. The reason for 
this is because both systems have the most progressive competition laws. As stated 
earlier, unilateral behaviours adopted by dominant firms are called exclusionary 
because they aim at discouraging potential rivals' entry into the relevant market or 
conversely, they intend to gradually drive existing competitors off the market.43
      Article 82 of the EC Treaty and Section 2 of the Sherman Act are often regarded 
as similar provisions because they both prohibit unilateral conduct which influences 
a certain market, and has the effect of impairing trade between member States.
 In 
other words, exclusionary conduct is directly aimed at competitors, and only by 
damaging the latter does it cause a lessening of competition that ultimately damages 
consumers. Under this chapter, the American Sherman Act and the European 
Commission Treaty Article 82 will be dealt with highlighting the significant 
similarities and differences.  
44 In 
both cases the conduct becomes relevant when a certain degree of economic power is 
involved and in both cases the conduct, although generally adopted by a single 
undertaking, can also be pursued by more than one firm.45
 
 Nonetheless, despite these 
apparent similarities, several differences can also be traced between the two 
provisions. For instance, a major difference is that European competition laws do not 
punish conduct aimed at obtaining a dominant position. The mere attainment of a 
position of dominance in itself will not be punished under the European Union 
whereas the Sherman Act punishes both “monopolization” and “attempt to 
monopolize” cases. 
 
 
                                                          
43 John Marshall (note 1) at pg 2. 
44 ibid at page 4. 
45 Ibid. 
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2.1. Abuse of Dominant Position under U.S. Antitrust Law: Monopolization and 
Attempt to Monopolize  
The meaning of the word "monopolize" has been the subject of much discussion 
since the enactment of the Sherman Act. Making profits is the ultimate goal of every 
firm so it is easy to understand the scepticism that has surrounded Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act whose strict interpretation could possibly punish companies that have 
acquired market power through legitimate means, usually referred to as competition 
on the merits.46 This tension has been recognized since the very early days of 
American antitrust history when the Supreme Court clarified that "the law does not 
make mere size an offence or the existence of unexerted power an offence."47 In a 
statement later confirmed in the famous Alcoa case, Judge Hand held that "the 
successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when 
he wins.”48
      Section 2 of the Sherman Act punishes, with a fine or by imprisonment or both,  
 
"every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or 
combine or conspire with another person or persons, to monopolize any 
part of the trade or commerce among the several States.”  
 
The most important thing to keep in mind about section 2 of the Sherman Act is 
that it is meant to punish two different types of behaviours which are monopolization 
and the attempt to monopolize. 
As far as the mere monopolization claim is concerned, jurisprudence has recently 
clarified that "the offence of monopoly under S 2 of the Sherman Act has two 
elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market, and (2) the 
wilful acquisition or maintenance of the power as distinguished from growth or 
development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen or historic 
accident."49
                                                          
46 John Marshall (note 1) at pg 2. 
 While mere possession of monopoly power is not sufficient to trigger 
section 2 monopolization claims, it is a necessary precondition because 
monopolization can be described as the conduct of a firm that already has a position 
of strength on the market and adopts anticompetitive exclusionary strategies to the 
47 U.S. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 451 (1920). 
48 U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir 1945). 
49 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 595-597 (1985). 
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ultimate goal of preserving such position or further enlarging it.50
An attempt to monopolize differs from monopolization because it regards 
conduct of a company that aims to achieve monopoly power in a certain market.
 
51 
Understandably, attempt to monopolization claims present an even harder case than 
mere monopolization because every firm tends to achieve a position of strength in 
the market. Therefore, in theory, each conduct could be characterized as an attempt 
to monopolize. This surely explains why American jurisprudence has crafted a 
somewhat more complex test for attempt cases, establishing that liability is found 
when there is proof of: 1) a predatory or anticompetitive conduct, 2) a specific intent 
to monopolize and 3) a dangerous probability of success.52
The first and the second elements are closely related because in attempt cases, a 
stronger proof of intent is often inferred by the type of conduct adopted by the firm 
as well as the strategies chosen to implement it.
 
53 The reason for this can be easily 
understood. Each competitor aims to win the game of competition, a mere intent to 
exclude competitors, usually present in most section 2 cases, is not deemed enough 
for attempt cases.54 The range of conduct that might constitute attempts to 
monopolize is quite broad. In this regard it is interesting to note that the word 
anticompetitive in the test prescribed above in the case of attempt to monopolize has 
been broadly interpreted by the jurisprudence in such a way to include unfair 
practices.55
The third requirement of the test, the dangerous probability of success relies on 
structural factors namely, market shares, number of competitors, barriers to entry and 
all other elements determining the degree of market power already held by the firm 
attempting to obtain monopoly power.
 
56
                                                          
50 Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and its Practice 2nd ed. 
(1999) pg 274 
 Clearly, the stronger the power already 
detained by the firm, the bigger the chances that it will succeed in obtaining 
51 John Marshall (note 1) at pg 2. 
52 Ibid pg 3. This test has been first inferred from the case Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 
396 (1905), and it has been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in 1985 in Spectrum Sports Inc. v. 
McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 457 (1993). 
53 Ibid. 
54Sullivan & Harrison, ‘Understanding Antitrust and its Economic Implications’, 2003 Understanding 
Series, LexisNexis at 204. 
55 John Marshall (note 1) at pg 3. 
56 Ibid. 
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monopoly power, hence the more dangerous the conduct.57
Several tests have been proposed to identify exclusionary conduct under Section 
2 and will be discussed separately. 
  
2.1.1. The No Economic Sense Test 
      This test was advocated by the Solicitor General of the USA and states that 
“conduct is not exclusionary or predatory unless it would make no economic sense 
for the defendant but for the tendency to eliminate or lessen competition.”58 In other 
words, that test asks whether challenged conduct would have been expected to be 
profitable apart from any gains that conduct may produce through eliminating 
competition.59 Application of the no economic sense test is conceptually 
straightforward. If conduct allegedly threatens to create a monopoly because of a 
tendency to exclude existing competitors, the test is whether the conduct would 
likely have been profitable if the existing competitors were not excluded and 
monopoly was not created.60
    Applying the no economic sense test requires consideration of both the gains from 
the challenged conduct which is separate from profits obtained from eliminating 
competition, and the costs of undertaking the conduct. The fact that a conduct 
produces some gross benefit for the defendant is not a sufficient basis for concluding 
that it makes economic sense.
  
61 According to Werden, conduct fails the no economic 
sense test if it is expected to yield a negative payoff, net of the costs of undertaking 
the conduct, and not including any payoff from eliminating competition.62
     The no economic sense test looks at the reasonably anticipated impact of the 
challenged conduct when undertaken, and not into the actual impact of the conduct. 
Actual effects can provide powerful evidence of the reasonably anticipated effects, 
but actual effects also can be entirely irrelevant.
 
63
                                                          
57 Ibid. 
 For instance, sound business 
decisions may prove unprofitable not because of the manner of implementing the 
58 Gregory J. Werden, ‘Identifying Exclusionary Conduct Under Section 2: The "No Economic Sense" 
Test’, (2006) 73 Antitrust L.J. 413 at 413. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid pg 2. 
61 Andrew I. Gavil, ‘Exclusionary Distribution Strategies by Dominant Firms: Striking a Better 
Balance,’ (2005) 72 Antitrust L.J. 3 at 53. 
62 Werden (note 58) at pg 2. 
63 Ibid. 
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decision but because of misfortune or ineptitude, and competition law should not 
deem such conduct as exclusionary. Marketplace conduct may also prove profitable 
for reasons that could not have been anticipated when it was undertaken, and such 
unanticipated profits should not preclude a finding that conduct is exclusionary. 
In applying the no economic sense test, what matters are the objective economic 
considerations for a reasonable person, and not the state of mind of any particular 
decision maker.64
2.1.2. The Profit Sacrifice Test 
 The no economic sense test is described as similar to the short-run 
profit sacrifice test which is discussed below. 
 The profit-sacrifice test examines the profitability of the defendant's conduct 
relative to a hypothetical market outcome that is used as the non-exclusionary 
benchmark.65 The hypothetical “but-for” marketplace is one in which it is impossible 
to raise prices following the exclusionary conduct.66 When exclusionary conduct 
potentially raises barriers to competition in some way, a defendant's exclusionary 
conduct can be said to sacrifice profits if the conduct would have been unprofitable 
in the absence of those enhanced barriers to competition.67 The standard evaluates 
whether conduct “would make no economic sense for the defendant but for the 
tendency to eliminate or lessen competition.”68  That is, the conduct would not be 
profit-maximizing absent its anticompetitive effect. This variation is primarily 
different from the conventional profit-sacrifice standard because it does not require a 
showing that there is a period of time in which the defendant's profits are lower than 
they were before the exclusionary conduct was undertaken.69
Although this standard shares many obvious similarities with the standard 
version of the no economic sense test, the no economic sense conceptualization 
resolves some of the implementation pitfalls of the standard profit-sacrifice 
formulation. While quite similar to the profit-sacrifice test, commentators have noted 
that a short-term profit sacrifice is neither necessary nor sufficient for conduct to be 
  
                                                          
64 Gavil (note 61). 
65 Steven C. Salop, ‘Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Consumers, and the Flawed Profit-Sacrifice 
Standard’, (2006) 73 Antitrust L.J. 311 at 4 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Verizon Communications Inc v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP,540 U.S. 398 (2004)(No. 02-
682) pg 15. 
69 Salop (note 65).  
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deemed exclusionary by the no economic sense test.70
2.1.3. Consumer Welfare Test 
  
     The consumer welfare test which has also been proposed by academic scholars 
has also had its fair share of controversy trailing it for its inconsistency with the 
language of s 2 of the Sherman Act. Professor Salop advocates this test stating that 
any marketplace conduct harmful to consumers can and should be condemned under 
s 2.71 Under this standard, it can be concluded that exclusionary conduct violates 
antitrust laws if it reduces competition without creating a sufficient improvement in 
performance to fully offset potential adverse effects on prices to prevent consumer 
harm.72 Such conduct could be labeled “unreasonably exclusionary.”73 Despite the 
use of the term “consumer welfare,” the evaluation is really about whether 
consumers are harmed from higher prices, reduced quality, or reduced innovation. 
Thus, a better term might well be a “consumer harm” standard rather than a 
“consumer welfare” standard.74 What is important is that this test focuses on the 
effect of the conduct on the market, that is, consumers and the competitive process. 
In contrast, the other standards, the profit sacrifice and the no economic sense tests 
are focused instead on the impact of the conduct on the alleged offender. This is the 
key reason why the other standards are flawed according to Salop.75
     A consumer welfare effect standard for evaluating the s 2 liability flows directly 
from the Court's observation that antitrust is a consumer welfare prescription. Such a 
standard was adopted explicitly by the D.C. Circuit in United States v. Microsoft
  
76, in 
which the Court outlined a test requiring the plaintiff to prove that consumers would 
be harmed. If such proof is made, the monopolist may offer a pro-competitive 
justification for its conduct. This justification can be either invalidated by the 
plaintiff or the beneficial impact on consumers can be shown to outweigh evidence 
of anticompetitive consumer harm.77
                                                          
70 Ibid.  
 In this way, the likely effect on consumer 
welfare is predicted.    According to Salop, antitrust law focuses on consumer 
71 Salop (note 65) at pg 8. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Herbert Hovenkamp, ‘Exclusion and the Sherman Act’, (2005) 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 147 at 154  
74 Salop (note 65) at pg 8. 
75 Ibid. 
76 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
77 Ibid at 58-59. 
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welfare, not the defendant's profits or the protection of competitors.78 In most 
antitrust cases, the profit-sacrifice and consumer welfare effect standards will reach 
the same outcome which is a fact based analysis of the competitive effect of the 
alleged anticompetitive monopolizing conduct. However, there is no reason to think 
that the impact on the defendant's profits in the hypothetical world of the profit-
sacrifice test would be a good proxy for the impact on consumers.79
     The consumer welfare effect analysis generally would be an ex ante analysis, not 
an ex post facto analysis.
 
80 That is, the court would evaluate the likelihood and 
magnitude of expected consumer benefits or harms based on the information 
reasonably available at the time that the conduct was undertaken. It would not simply 
examine the ultimate ex post facto market effect. A key issue would be what 
consumer effect was reasonably foreseeable at the time of the investment. Also, the 
profit-sacrifice standard allows ex ante and ex post facto types of errors to be made. 
It permits conduct that causes ex post facto consumer harms. It also permits 
exclusionary conduct that causes ex ante consumer harms, for example, conduct that 
reduces expected consumer welfare, taking into account the probability of benefits 
and harms.81
Despite the strong advocacy for the Consumer welfare test by Salop, Werden 
argues that as interpreted by the Supreme Court, s 2 simply does not permit such an 
approach. As the Court noted in Trinko, s 2 “does not give judges carte blanche to 
insist that a monopolist alter its way of doing business whenever some other 
approach might yield greater competition.”
  
82 Although the Court has described the 
Sherman Act as a “consumer welfare prescription,” the Court also has made clear 
that s 2 sweeps far less broadly than s 1.83 While the s 1 test for legality is whether 
the conduct “imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition,” the Court in Trinko 
has held that harm “to the competitive process,” and not just to consumer welfare, is 
required to violate the Act.84
                                                          
78 Salop (note 65) at pg 10. 
  
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid at pg 13. 
81 Ibid at pg 14. 
82 Werden (note 58) at pg 6. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 
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      For half a century, the law's dominant paradigm for addressing single-firm 
exclusionary conduct under the US jurisdiction was the one articulated by the 
Supreme Court in Aspen.85 By the rule in Aspen, a monopoly firm has a duty not to 
significantly exclude or handicap rivals by a refusal to deal unless there are “valid 
business reasons for the refusal.” In 2004 in Verizon v. Trinko86
      The Court held that even monopoly firms have the fundamental right to refuse to 
deal and that exceptions to this rule should be narrowly construed.
, the Supreme Court 
embraced a narrower perspective. It announced that Section 2 is an instrument to be 
applied reluctantly because it is difficult to separate anticompetitive exclusionary 
conduct from legitimate competition and courts are prone to make wrong decisions. 
87 The Court 
reconceived Aspen as merely an exception to a strong freedom-not-to-deal rule, and 
it distinguished that case from Trinko on its facts. The Aspen exception, it is said, 
requires that defendant engage in a voluntary course of dealing and terminate that 
course of dealing, sacrificing profits in the short term to achieve higher supra-
competitive profits in the long run.88 Some scholars have concluded that the Supreme 
Court has now adopted a sacrifice-of-profits rule for a Section 2 violation. Eleanor 
Fox argues that to be sure, the Court's majority in Trinko favors a minimal 
interpretation of Section 2 and the profit sacrifice test if combined with availability 
of a good business justification is a minimal interpretation of Section 2.89
It therefore appears that of all the three tests discussed above, the profit sacrifice 
test seems to be the one favoured by the US Courts for dealing with exclusionary 
conduct.  
 
2.2. Exclusionary Conduct in Abuse of dominant positions in EU Competition 
Law 
Article 82 of the European Commission (EC) Treaty expressly establishes that  
‘Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within 
the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as 
                                                          
85 Eleanor Fox ‘Is there life in Aspen after Trinko? The silent revolution of s 2 of the Sherman Act’ 
(2005)  73 Antitrust L.J. 153 at pg 2  
86 Note 68 
87 ibid 
88  Fox (note 85) at pg 8 
89 Ibid pg 9 
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incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade 
between Member States. Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or unfair 
trading conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets, or technical development to the prejudice of 
consumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading 
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other 
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according 
to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such 
contracts’. 
     The first paragraph of Art. 82 of the EC Treaty show that five elements must be 
present before it applies. These are: 
(a) one or more undertakings; 
(b) in a dominant position; 
(c) within the common market or a substantial part of it; 
(d) abusing the dominant position; 
(e) in such a way as to affect trade between Member States. 
      If any one of these elements is missing, Art. 82 does not apply. As seen above, 
the article provides a list of examples of abusive conduct, but EC founders 
purposefully left open both the concept of dominance and of abuse which have been 
elaborated upon by European Courts.90
“A situation where a company detains such a position of strength on a 
certain market that it can make its own business strategy and decision 
without taking into consideration how competitors and customers will react 
and how consumers will be ultimately affected by it.” 
 What is meant by a ‘dominant position’ is 
central to the operation of Art. 82. EU case law has adopted a rather comprehensive 
definition of dominance. A dominant position has been defined as 
 
      The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has further described a dominant position as 
follows: 
                                                          
90 Art. 82 EC Treaty explains that an abuse may consist in: "(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair 
purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions; (b) limiting production, markets or 
technical development to the prejudice of consumers; (c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent 
transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; (d) making 
the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations 
which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such 
contracts." 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
25 
 
‘... The dominant position thus referred to [in Article 82] relates to a 
position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to 
prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by 
affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of 
its competitors, customers and ultimately of its consumers’.91
 
 
      The practice of the ECJ and the Commission in determining whether an 
undertaking is in a dominant position involves a two-stage process. Firstly the 
relevant market is identified and secondly the power of the undertaking on that 
market is assessed.92 The problem with this approach is that relevant markets are not 
easily defined and it is not possible to completely divide the definition of the market 
from the issue of the undertaking’s power on the market.93 Nor can power on a 
market always be assessed by concentrating on that market alone, for factors outside 
it may affect competition within it.94
According to some commentators, the ECJ has purposefully linked the power to 
prevent the maintenance of a competitive asset in the market to the power to behave 
independently, as if the former can only occur if the latter has been found.
 These complications are well illustrated in the 
case law and decisions on Article 82, which also show that the definition of the 
market may be affected by the nature of the abuse in issue 
95 This 
assumption seems reasonable because the concept of independence has often been 
referred to as the special feature of dominance.96 Nonetheless, some other 
commentators prefer the part of the definition that describes dominance as the power 
to prevent effective competition being maintained, as this seems closely related to the 
economic concept of market power.97
Although it has become common, even in the language of the EC, to talk about 
undertakings' market power as a synonym of a position of strength in a certain 
market, the concept of dominance is more comprehensive than market power as it 
 
                                                          
91 Case 27/76 United Brands v EC Commission [1978] ECR 207, [1978] 1 CMLR 429. 
92 Para 350, Chapter 2 EC Law: The Structure of Article 82. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Thomas Eilmansberger, ‘Dominance-The Lost Child? How Effects-Based Rules Could and Should 
Change Dominance Analysis’, (2006) 2 European Competition Journal pg 15. 
96 Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission, [1979] ECR I-461, paras 42-48. 
97 Werden (note 58) at pg 3. 
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goes far beyond the power over prices.98 Assessment of a position of dominance 
indeed takes into account a vast array of factors which is aimed at evaluating the 
overall commercial and economic position a certain undertaking has on a certain 
market vis-à-vis its competitors, but it does so without inquiring upon the conduct 
pursued by the firm.99
The EC case law has explained that the concept of abuse is an objective notion 
which is connected to dominance and it is distinct from it at the same time. It is 
linked to dominance in the sense that without dominance the behaviour would not be 
punished.
  
100 But it is distinct because the abuse amounts to a separate moment. The 
abuse takes place when competition on the market has already been distorted by the 
presence of the dominant position and it is punished expressly because it further 
disrupts this scenario by means different from competition on the merits.101 
According to the European Commission of Justice102
“The concept of an abuse is an objective concept relating to the behaviour of 
an undertaking in a dominant position which is such as to influence the 
structure of a market where, as a result of the very presence of the 
undertaking in question, the degree of competition is weakened and which, 
through recourse to methods different from those which condition normal 
competition in products or services on the basis of the transactions of 
commercial operators, has the effect of hindering the maintenance of the 
degree of competition still existing in the market or the growth of that 
competition” 
,  
 
 
Two recent cases in the ECJ, Michelin II and British Airways (BA) both concern 
Commission decisions condemning price discount schemes by dominant firms. In 
both cases one of the central arguments of the applicant was that the Commission 
had not shown that the schemes had produced or would produce any harmful 
effects.103 In both cases this argument was rejected, not on factual grounds, but on 
the ground that there was no legal requirement for the Commission to show the 
likelihood of actual anticompetitive effects.104
                                                          
98 ‘The Concept of Dominance in Article 82’, 2 ECJ, 31, special issue (2006). 
 In British Airways the Court of First 
99 Werden (note 58) at pg 3. 
100 Ibid at pg 4. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission, [1979] ECR 461, P 91. 
103 John Kallaugher, Brian Sher ‘Rebates Revisited: Anti-Competitive Effects and Exclusionary Abuse 
under Article 82’ (2004) 5 E.C.L.R. at 2. 
104 Ibid. 
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Instance held that  
"for the purposes of establishing an infringement of Art.82 EC, it is not 
necessary to demonstrate that the abuse in question had a concrete effect 
on the markets concerned. It is sufficient in that respect to demonstrate 
that the abusive conduct tends to restrict competition, or in other words, 
that the conduct is capable of having, or likely to have, such an effect".105
 
  
In the judgment, the Court of First Instance held that all that was needed for 
infringement of Art.82 to be established was for the system to "tend to prevent 
customers obtaining supplies from rival producers".106 The Court of First Instance 
further held that BA's discount system did just that because the schemes were 
progressive, with increased commission rates "capable of rising exponentially from 
one reference period to another" and the Court of First Instance did not believe BA's 
five main competitors could be regarded as being in a position to grant similar 
advantages to travel agents, in view of the fact that BA sold a multiple of the tickets 
sold by all five of those competitors combined.107
In Michelin II the Court of First Instance specifically stated that under Art.82 
there is no need to show anti-competitive effect. Instead the Court ruled that conduct 
can be abusive if it "tends to restrict competition or, in other words, that the conduct 
is capable of having that effect".
 
108 The Michelin II judgment justified this rule by 
reference to cases that establish that it is sufficient under Art.82 to show that conduct 
has the object of restricting competition. Since in Michelin II the object of Michelin 
was to make dealers more loyal, this practice must, according to the Court, have been 
susceptible of restricting competition.109 Michelin II also addressed a second issue 
that is important for the assessment of exclusionary abuse; the extent to which a 
dominant firm can assert an efficiency justification for conduct that is otherwise 
abusive.110 Thus the Court of First Instance set a threshold for exclusionary abuse 
that requires no actual harm, no likelihood of harm, but rather, the mere potential for 
harm.111
                                                          
105 British Airways v Commission Case T-219/99 para 293. 
 This threshold focuses on the restriction on the customer, rather than the 
106 Ibid para 247. 
107 Ibid. paras [247], [272] and [276]. 
108 Michelin v Commission Case T-203/01 para 239. 
109 Ibid paras 241 and 244. 
110 Ibid paras 98-110. 
111 Kallaugher (note 103) at pg 4. 
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effect on the competitor.112
The reasoning that underpins this position was discussed in a paper by Luc 
Gyselen, the Director of Competition in the European Commission in 2003, where he 
referred to the "structuralist" approach to exclusionary abuse under Art.82 and brings 
into the open the policy issues which underpin the rules set out in these Court 
judgments. Indeed, there are indications in the wording and analytical approach of 
the Court judgments that suggest that the Gyselen paper may have had a direct 
influence on the approach taken by the Court.
  
113
The conceptual framework of the Gyselen paper is based on the premise that 
Art.82 is meant to protect competition as "a structural process of rivalry."
 The test for abuse proposed by 
Gyselen, like that set out subsequently by the Court prohibits any conduct that has an 
appreciable potential for anticompetitive effect. 
114 Gyselen 
suggests that where pricing practices "artificially foreclose business opportunities" 
for the competitors of a dominant firm, those practices may "harm the competitive 
process."115 He suggests further that intervention by an antitrust enforcer to protect 
this process is justified because of a faith that the process of rivalry will contribute 
"in the longer run" to customer and consumer welfare.116 He cautions, however, that 
the relationship between the protection of rivalry and the eventual contribution to 
customer and consumer welfare "should have sound economic underpinnings" 
because otherwise the enforcer could end up protecting rivals, rather than protecting 
the process of rivalry.117
Gyselen identified a two step approach for assessing exclusionary abuse claims 
under Art.82. The Paper argues that the first step in an abuse case should be to 
identify whether there is "foreclosure".
 
118
                                                          
112 Ibid. 
 Gyselen does not define what is meant by 
foreclosure but the introductory comments in the paper suggest that the question to 
be addressed is how dominant companies artificially raise the barriers to entry for the 
dominant company's competitors. Where the Commission can make the requisite 
113 Ibid.  
114 Luc Gyselen, ‘Rebates, Competition on the Merits or Exclusionary Practice?’ European 
Competition Law Annual 2003: What is Abuse of a Dominant Position (Hart Publishing). 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Ibid. 
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showing of foreclosure, the second step in the test would shift the burden to the 
dominant firm to show an efficiency justification for the conduct in question. This 
test would allow conduct that is justified on efficiency grounds, provided that the 
benefits were proportionate to the foreclosure effect. 
      A relevant question to consider is what level of foreclosure the Commission must 
demonstrate to justify its intervention under Art.82? Foreclosure is a tricky concept, 
but Prof. Kallaugher argues that Gyeselen is correct in suggesting that an abuse test 
requires some measure of actual or potential competitive harm that can loosely be 
described as a foreclosure effect in the context of exclusionary conduct.119
When the ECJ articulated its test for exclusionary abuse in Hoffman-La Roche 
and Michelin I, it essentially adopted the approach that abuse consists of conduct: 
  He 
identifies this as the possible harm test and finds it consistent with the structuralist 
approach to Art.82 that focuses on changes in market structure rather than directly 
focussing on conduct in the market or the economic effects of such conduct. 
(1) that has the effect of reducing the competition in a market or preventing 
the emergence of new competition; and 
(2) where the effect is caused "by means other than normal competition on 
the basis of the performance of commercial operators".120
      It is very tempting, particularly from a comparative law perspective, to link the 
Court's application of the performance based competition test to a "business 
justification" defence as found in US law under the Sherman Act. The Court of 
Appeals in Microsoft has suggested that where there is a showing of significant anti-
competitive harm and a showing of business justification, there must be a balancing 
test; the consumer welfare benefit of the practice must be compared to the 
anticompetitive harm.
  
121 In effect, the Microsoft court would resolve monopolisation 
claims using an approach analogous to that applied in a rule of reason approach.122
        Kallaugher argues that a better test would be to compare the harm resulting 
from the conduct with the commercial benefit of the conduct. He argues that where 
there are serious anti-competitive effects, it may be appropriate to require a showing 
 
                                                          
119 Ibid at pg 12. 
120 Kallaugher (note 103) at pg 9. 
121 United States v Microsoft Corp, 253 F.3d 34, 56-57 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
122 Op cit note 120. 
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of substantial benefits directly linked to the conduct that would exist irrespective of 
the exclusionary impact of the conduct, and even this showing may not be sufficient 
to justify some practices by real monopolists.123  He argues further that this approach 
can only work if the foreclosure investigation focuses on identifying anti-competitive 
harm that can be compared to pro-competitive benefits.124
        A structural analysis remains the point of departure for assessing dominance 
under Art.82 and this article is seen as protecting a process that has long run benefits, 
not on preventing losses to consumer welfare in the short or medium term.
 
125 Thus to 
protect the structural process of rivalry, the implication is that the Commission needs 
to protect the market structure that facilitates that rivalry.126 Kallaugher argues 
against a pure structuralist approach because of its lack of sound economic 
underpinnings. According to him, a structuralist approach runs the risk of prohibiting 
conduct that can promote consumer welfare in the short or long term.127 He argues 
further that a structuralist approach will inevitably result in protecting competitors 
rather than competition in many cases and for these reasons, the possible harm test 
cannot be reconciled with a competition policy based on economic effects.128
2.3. Comparing the EU and USA Exclusionary Provisions 
 
Art. 82 of the EC Treaty and s 2 of the Sherman Act are often regarded as similar 
provisions because both are meant to prohibit unilateral conduct which influences a 
particular market. In both cases the conduct becomes relevant when a certain degree 
of economic power is involved and in both cases the conduct, although generally 
adopted by a single undertaking, can also be pursued by more than one firm.129
The first relevant difference is that the European competition laws do not punish 
conduct aimed at obtaining a dominant position unlike attempt to monopolize cases 
 
Nonetheless, despite these apparent commonalities, several differences can be traced 
in the two provisions. 
                                                          
123 Kallaugher (note 103) at pg 23. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Ibid at pg 15. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid at pg 16. 
128 Ibid. 
129 John Marshall (note 1) at pg 4. 
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in the US.130 A finding of dominance is the fundamental point for assessing 
unilateral abuses; therefore, whatever the means and the strategies applied to achieve 
it, the mere attainment of a position of dominance in itself will not be punished.131
A second difference between the two doctrines is the fact that the European 
assessment of unilateral conduct does not take intent into account. T
 
Only the abuse of such position can trigger liability under Art. 82, therefore, no 
attempt claims can be pursued in Europe even where there is clear evidence that the 
company engaged in the practice with the specific intent to damage a competitor.  
he ECJ clarifies 
that the concept of abuse is an objective concept and, as a general rule, its assessment 
is not made dependent on an evaluation of the intent of a dominant undertaking.132
Another significant difference with regard to the assessment of abuse and 
monopolization or attempt to monopolize can be found in the defensive tools 
dominant firms have at their disposal once their conduct has been found abusive. 
Under Art. 82 of the EC Treaty, the firm can defend itself insofar as it can 
demonstrate that it has taken "reasonable steps as it deems appropriate to protect its 
interests, provided however that the purpose of such behaviour is not to strengthen 
this dominant position and abuse it".
 
133 Also, a firm might justify its conduct 
asserting that it has been forced to undertake such behaviour in order to minimize the 
losses it would suffer from the competition.134 Under American antitrust law, 
dominant firms can defend themselves by simply asserting that their conduct is likely 
to pass efficiencies on consumers and that a balancing of the pro- and anti-
competitive effects caused by the practice shows that the latter does not have the 
ultimate effect of harming consumers.135
The two approaches above are clearly different. The European concept of 
'objective justification' appears as a limited defensive instrument whereby the 
undertaking claims that the conduct was not abusive because it only engaged in the 
 
                                                          
130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission [1979] ECR 461, P 91. 
133 Atlantic Container Line AB and Others v. Commission, Joined cases T-191/98, T-212/98 to T-
214/98, [2003] ECR II-3275, P 1113. 
134 European Commission Discussion Paper, supra at PP 81-83. 
135John Marshall (note 1) at pg 4. 
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conduct to defend its own business.136 On the contrary, the American approach 
seems more like an affirmative instrument aimed at showing the overall pro-
competitive character of the behaviour.137 This difference is clearly stated by the 
wording of the Court of First Instance explaining that companies cannot justify their 
conduct on the basis that they bring about certain advantages for themselves or for 
consumers.138
The European Commission seems to have endorsed a different approach towards 
the efficiency defence by stating that exclusionary conduct may fall outside the ambit 
of the prohibition of Art. 82 if the dominant undertaking can prove that its conduct 
produces efficiencies that outweigh the negative impact on competition.
  
139 However, 
while the position of the Commission is not yet firmly grounded, it should be pointed 
out that the European defence based on efficiency seems reasonably narrower in 
scope than its American counterpart. The European Commission in its Discussion 
Paper presents a four-prong test which is not easy to comply with. Accordingly, the 
dominant company has to prove that: a) the allegedly abusive conduct has realized or 
is likely to realize efficiencies; b) the conduct is indispensable to produce such 
efficiencies; c) the efficiencies benefit consumers; d) competition in a substantial part 
of the products concerned is not eliminated.140
American antitrust law has evolved more and more towards the idea of antitrust 
as a "consumer welfare prescription". This view has led courts to specifically 
concentrate on conduct whose effect directly restrains output or increases price, to 
the immediate detriment of consumers, and to disregard practices that do not directly 
cause such an effect not distorting of competitive equilibria.
 
141
                                                          
136 The ECJ has often explained that undertakings do not have an unconstrained right to protect their 
commercial interests; rather, their defensive actions must be proportionate to the desired goal and not 
result in conduct that strengthen or abuse of a dominant position. United Brands Company and United 
Brands Continentaal BV v. Commission of the European Communities, case 27/76, [1978] ECR 207, 
PP 189-190. 
 Although actual proof 
of harm to consumer welfare is not expressly required by the Sherman Act, an 
exclusionary conduct will not be punished lacking clear evidence of consumer 
137 Op cit note 135. 
138 Atlantic Container Line AB and Others v. Commission, Joined cases T-191/98, T-212/98 to T-
214/98, [2003] ECR II-3275, P 1114. 
139 Ibid. 
140 European Commission Discussion Paper, pg 84-92. 
141 Eleanor M. Fox, ‘What is Harm to Competition? Exclusionary Practices and Anticompetitive 
Effect’, (2002) 70 Antitrust L.J. 371. 
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harm.142 As a result, the concept of anticompetitive conduct entirely reverts to 
whether the conduct harms consumers, in the sense that it actually diminishes 
consumer welfare.143
On the contrary, European competition bodies have always regarded consumer 
welfare as one important goal of competition policy; however, they have shown 
equal concerns towards the protection and safeguard of competitive structures of 
markets and openness.
 
144 More specifically, while the Commission explains that the 
protection of competition on the market is ultimately intended at enhancing 
consumer welfare, it has been clearly stated that competition as an institution must be 
considered the main priority of competition rules.145 This substantial difference 
regarding the policy goals of antitrust law bears a significant impact on the practical 
assessment of anticompetitive conduct in general and exclusionary conduct in 
particular. In fact, European antitrust law does not require evidence of consumer 
welfare as further element to prove the abuse.146 Rather, consumer damage is 
presumed whenever the distortion of competition, already caused by the same 
presence of the dominant firm on the market, is brought one step further by the 
abusive conduct.147
The way American and European bodies frame anticompetitive conduct is 
probably one of the most sensible differences in comparative antitrust law. As 
anticipated, the European abuse of dominant provision in Art. 82 codifies a list of 
anticompetitive conduct that falls under the category of abuse. Although the list is 
not exhaustive, when evaluating an alleged anticompetitive practice, European 
competition agencies would be expected to see whether it falls under one of the 
specified categories of abuses. On the contrary, this attitude does not seem to 
permeate American antitrust law, where both s 1 and s 2 of the Sherman Act do not 
provide any list of anticompetitive practices and merely set two big frameworks 
under which anticompetitive conduct might fall. 
  
As a general tendency, modern American antitrust law does not seem concerned 
                                                          
142 John Marshall (note 1) at pg 5. 
143 supra. 
144 Ibid  
145 Ibid. 
146Ibid. 
147 Ibid. 
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about framing conduct in order to fit within specific categories of anticompetitive 
behaviours, rather, it seems more interested in finding when the conduct brings about 
an anticompetitive effect on the market.148
2.4. Using Refusals to Deal cases as a practical differentiation between 
American and European Exclusionary Practices 
 Under American antitrust law, certain 
specific types of conduct have been codified by statutory provisions and have been 
specifically developed through the case law. 
Broadly speaking, refusals to deal involve the conduct of a company that has 
exclusive control over a scarce resource, no matter whether tangible or intangible, or 
an infrastructure whose access is indispensable to compete in a certain market or in a 
separate but closely related market.149
American and European approaches towards refusals to deal differ with regard to 
both the normative framework and the practical assessment of the cases. American 
antitrust assessment of refusals to deal comes under s 2 of the Sherman Act as either 
monopolization or attempt to monopolize. It is widely acknowledged that a dominant 
firm's unilateral refusal to deal with a competitor may constitute prima facie evidence 
of exclusionary conduct when the refusal harms the competitive process.
 The undertaking takes advantage of such 
strategic position and employs it in order to preserve or strengthen its dominant 
position in that market or to acquire it in the closely related market. 
150 
Generally, harm to competition is presumed when the behaviour causes a reduction 
in output and an increase in price in the relevant market, or by a decrease in overall 
efficiency level in the market that impacts negatively on consumers.151
American antitrust treatment of monopolization cases in general and refusal to 
deal cases in particular tends to focus its attention exclusively on the market where 
the conduct under analysis displays its effects.
 Where proof 
of harm to the competitive process is established, the dominant firm may rebut the 
presumption by establishing valid business justification for its conduct.  
152
                                                          
148 Ibid. 
 This means that the monopolization 
claim under s 2 will be framed as monopolization or attempt to monopolize 
149ibid at pg 6. 
150 John Marshall (note 1) at pg 6. 
151 Ibid. 
152 Ibid. 
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depending on the degree of market power held by the company in the market that 
will be ultimately affected by the anticompetitive conduct.153
      If an undertaking has exclusive control on a certain infrastructure which is 
necessary to provide a certain service and such undertaking denies access to the 
infrastructure to its competitors, the conduct will be framed as a monopolization case 
or as an attempt to monopolize depending on the level of market power held by the 
undertaking on the service market.
 
154
European antitrust law proceeds in a different way. As explained earlier, because 
refusals to deal cases are assessed as abuse of dominant position under Art 82, the 
conduct can only be punished if the undertaking is found to be dominant in the first 
place. In this sense, preliminary finding of dominance represents a guarantee that 
such a duty can only be imposed on firms whose position of strength might allow 
them to unduly distort competition through the refusal.
 However, it often happens, in refusal to deal 
cases, that the undertaking involved is active in two market segments and that the 
alleged exclusionary behaviour is aimed at monopolizing a distinct market where the 
undertaking does not have a position of dominance. In any case, whether the refusal 
is framed as monopolization or attempt to monopolize, the focus of antitrust 
authorities is always towards the market where the anticompetitive conduct is going 
to display its effects. 
155
     It is possible however that the competition authorities are quite often confronted 
with market scenarios where a company is dominant in a certain market but the 
effects of its exclusionary conduct are going to be asserted on a second-related 
market where the company has no corresponding position of economic strength. 
Since European antitrust law does not punish "attempt" of abuses of dominant 
position, it could seem that such refusal to deal would risk going unpunished. This is 
not the case because European antitrust law regarding abuses of dominant position 
acknowledges the possibility that the anticompetitive conduct will produce its effects 
in a distinct market from the one where the undertaking is found to be dominant.  
 
                                                          
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid. 
155 Ibid. 
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      In the case of British Airways v Commission of the European Communities156, the 
case concerned an allegation of abuse of dominance by Virgin Airways that British 
Airways (BA) was using marketing and incentive agreements with travel agents to 
distort competition. The Commission for European Communities agreed that BA 
abused its dominant position in the United Kingdom market for air travel agency 
services which had an effect of distorting competition between BA and other airlines 
on the United Kingdom markets for air transport services.157 The Court of the 
European Communities held on appeal that BA could not accuse the commission of 
failing to demonstrate that its practices produced an exclusionary effect. According 
to the Court, for the purposes of establishing an infringement under Art 82 of the 
European Community Treaty prohibiting abuse of dominance, it is not necessary to 
demonstrate the abuse in question had a concrete effect on the markets concerned.158 
It is sufficient in that respect to demonstrate that the abusive conduct of the 
undertaking in a dominant position tends to restrict competition, or in other words, 
that the conduct is capable of having or likely to have such an effect.159
Specifically, the jurisprudence regarding refusals to deal has developed around 
the principle that undertakings dominant in one market should not try to extend such 
dominance to ancillary markets. Therefore, the European Commission will first focus 
on the market where the company detains its competitive advantage and inquire 
whether it holds a dominant position in that market and only then will it analyze the 
second-related market whose competition the dominant undertaking aims at 
distorting.
  
160 This is why European antitrust bodies often try to distinguish two 
distinct markets which are a primary market where the undertaking controls the 
strategic input and a secondary market where such input is necessary to compete.161
The difference between the two approaches has some relevance, especially with 
regard to cases where there is an attempt to monopolize. The possibility under 
American antitrust statutory provisions to raise a s 2 claim with no need to prove that 
the company already holds a substantive degree of monopoly power but rather a 
  
                                                          
156 First Chamber Case T-219/99. 
157 Ibid para 24 & 26. 
158 Ibid para 293. 
159 Ibid. 
160 Ibid. 
161 Ibid. 
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probability that market power will be achieved as a result of the conduct, seems to 
increase the chances that such a s 2 action will be filed.162 Nonetheless, because 
American assessment of refusal to deal does not take into account the strategic power 
that an undertaking might hold in an upstream market where it is dominant, 
demonstrating that market power will be actually achieved in the relevant market 
might not be easy in practice.163
South African law takes a slightly different approach to the American and 
European approaches and the next chapter will discuss this variation before I make a 
case for the more suitable approach. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
162 Ibid. 
163 For example, in the Microsoft case the Court divided Microsoft's conduct into three sets of 
anticompetitive behaviors: violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act (tying practices); violation of 
section 2 of the Sherman Act (monopolization of the operating system market); and violation of 
section 2 of the Sherman Act (attempt to monopolize the browser market). Not surprisingly, only the 
monopolization claim was affirmed while the attempted monopolization of the browser market (where 
Microsoft was not dominant) was dismissed. U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
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                                                    Chapter 3 
Exclusionary Practices in Abuse of Dominance in the South African     
Competition Act 
The South African definition of “dominance” is somewhat unusual when 
compared with the definitions in other jurisdictions. The peculiarity is that the South 
African legislation defines dominance by reference to specific market share 
thresholds and lays down an irrebutable presumption of dominance above a certain 
market share.164 In other jurisdictions, the legislation tends not to define dominance. 
Instead the courts have developed definitions of dominance based on actual market 
power, and these definitions do not generally include irrebutable presumptions based 
on market share.165 Where the case law does mention particular market shares as a 
guide to the enquiry, the presumptions of dominance tend to be at higher market 
shares than those laid down in the South African legislation.166
When approaching any potential instance of abuse of dominance, it is necessary 
to answer the following three questions:
 The South African 
legislature appears to have opted for a more rigid and explicit approach to the 
definition of dominance in the interest of greater certainty and simplicity. 
167
Section 8(c) and (d) of South Africa’s Competition Act of 1998 prohibits 
exclusionary practices:  
 Do the abuse provisions apply to the 
situation in question? Is the form in question dominant? If so, has the firm engaged 
in any conduct prohibited by the abuse provisions? Unless the answer to all three 
questions is in the affirmative, there is no liability under the abuse provisions. For a 
prohibition of exclusionary conduct to take effect, the first two questions must have 
been answered in the affirmative. The focus of this section is to answer the third 
question. To do so, the provision of s 8 must be considered.  
“It is prohibited for a dominant firm to - 
                                                          
164 Phillip Sutherland & Katharine Kemp Competition law of South Africa, LexisNexis Butterworths 
Durban 2000 chapter 7 pg 7-32. 
165 Ibid. 
166 S 7of  the Competition Act of 1998 provides a threshold of 45%, 35%, but less than 45%, of that 
market, unless it can show that it does not have market power; or it has less than 35% of that market 
but has market power. 
167Sutherland  (note 164) at pg 7-34. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
C
pe
 To
wn
39 
 
engage in an exclusionary act, other than an act listed in paragraph (d), if the 
anti-competitive effect of that act outweighs its technological, efficiency or 
other pro-competitive gain; or 
engage in any of the following exclusionary acts, unless the firm concerned can 
show technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive gains which outweigh 
the anti-competitive effect of its act – 
(i) requiring or inducing a supplier or customer to not deal with a 
competitor; 
(ii) refusing to supply scarce goods to a competitor when supplying 
those goods is economically feasible; 
(iii) selling goods or services on condition that the buyer purchases 
separate goods or services unrelated to the object of a contract, or 
forcing a buyer to accept a condition unrelated to the object of a 
contract; 
(iv) selling goods or services below their marginal or average variable 
cost; or 
(v) buying-up a scarce supply of intermediate goods or resources 
required by a competitor.” 
Section 8(d) lists five specific types of exclusionary acts that are prohibited so 
long as the complainant proves that the act in question had an anti-competitive effect 
and the respondent does not prove that the action resulted in certain pro-competitive 
gains that outweighed that effect. Each type of act is a recognised means by which a 
dominant firm can exclude other firms from a market with potentially anti-
competitive effects. Section 8(c) prohibits all those exclusionary acts not specifically 
listed in s 8(d), but only if the complainant proves that the act in question had an 
anti-competitive effect that outweighs any pro-competitive gain proved by the 
respondent.  
It is important to note that intention is not a prerequisite for abuse of dominance 
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under South African law.168 The complainant need not prove that the dominant firm 
aimed to misuse its market power or to create an anti-competitive effect.169 In some 
circumstances, proof of the respondent’s aim may strengthen objective evidence of 
likely anti-competitive effect.170 Also, it does not matter that third parties agreed to, 
or even requested the conduct engaged in the dominant firm.171 A customer or 
supplier who willingly entered into a prohibited agreement with the dominant firm 
cannot absolve the dominant firm by their waiver or consent.172 Abuse of dominance 
does not require another party as victim.173
Exclusionary acts are acts that impede or prevent a firm from entering into, or 
expanding within, a market.
  
174 Under s 8(c) and (d), the element of the two 
provisions essentially defines the nature of the acts targeted: the acts in question must 
be exclusionary, as opposed to acts that directly exploit consumers such as excessive 
pricing.175 A key problem that South Africa and other competition authorities face is 
that all competition is exclusionary.176 Every low price or innovation impedes other 
firms from entering into or expanding within a market. The critical question is: how 
does one distinguish between well-functioning competition and a malfunctioning 
one?177
As stated earlier, under s8(c), the complainant must prove that the anti-
competitive effect of the act out-weighs its technological, efficiency or other pro-
competitive gains. Under s 8(d), the complainant must show that the act had an anti-
competitive effect and if it does so, it will succeed in its claim unless the respondent 
shows technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive gains that outweigh the 
anti-competitive effect. It is important to not only distinguish between s 8(c) and (d) 
but also to explore the meaning of words in these sections. 
 This issue has generated a lot of research to obtain a suitable test to answer 
this question. 
The crucial difference between the two provisions is the probative deadlock on 
                                                          
168 Sutherland (note 164) at pg 7-35. 
169 Ibid. 
170 Ibid. 
171 Patensie Sitrus Beherend Beperk v Competition Commission CAC 16/CAC/Apr02 30. 
172 Sutherland (note 164) at pg 7-35. 
173 Patensie Sitrus Beherend Beperk v Competition Commission CAC 16/CAC/Apr02 24. 
174 Section 1 of the 1998 Competition Act. 
175 Sutherland (note 164) at pg 7-46. 
176 Ibid. 
177 Ibid. 
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the question of whether the act has a net positive or net negative effect where the 
respondent must be found innocent under s 8(c) and guilty under s 8(d).178 Since a 
number of factors affect the state of a market, it is impossible to say precisely to what 
extent an exclusionary act caused the harm that succeeded it. It is therefore likely to 
be a relatively common situation for the court to find that the net effect of the act is 
neither anti-competitive nor pro-competitive.179 In both circumstances, the onus 
applicable under the particular subsection will determine the fate of the dominant 
firm.180
The respondent under s 8(d) may be punished with a large fine for a first-time 
contravention while a respondent under s 8(c) may only receive such a fine if its 
conduct is a substantial repeat of a contravention that was the subject of a previous 
ruling.
 
181 This difference in treatment is explained as the fact that, by listing specific 
types of exclusionary conduct, s 8(d) warns dominant firms of certain behavioural 
“danger zones” whereas no specific warning is made under s 8(c).182
It is now necessary to explore the concepts in s 8. 
  
3.1. Anti-Competitive Effect 
The term anti-competitive effect is not defined in the Act and the term cannot be 
said to have any absolute meaning. In reality, what is labelled anti-competitive is 
merely that which a particular community regards as undesirable conduct in the 
context of commercial competition and that which is undesirable varies from 
community to community depending on the aspirations held for commercial 
competition.183 It depends on a community to determine what it will consider as fair 
or foul competition. Most emerging competition authorities draw a line where there 
is harm to consumer welfare.184 Most competition authorities consider that actual or 
threatened harm to consumer welfare does require intervention.185
                                                          
178 Sutherland (note 164) at pg 7-47. 
 Harm to consumer 
welfare may occur when a dominant firm’s exclusionary conduct leads or threatens 
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Section 58(1)(a)(iii) of the Competition Act. 
182 Competition Commission v South African Airways (Pty) Ltd 18/CR/MAR01 at para 102. 
183 Sutherland (note 164) at pg 7-48. 
184 Ibid. 
185 Ibid at 7-49. 
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to lead to lower market output, higher prices, reduced quality or innovation.186
It can be very difficult to prove that a dominant firm’s conduct actually causes 
harm to consumers, and so it is widely recognised that such harm to consumer 
welfare can be inferred from the impact of the dominant firm’s conduct on its rivals 
in the market in certain circumstances. In the USA, harm to consumer welfare may 
be inferred from conduct that significantly impairs the opportunities of rivals and that 
either does not further competition on the merits or does so in an unnecessarily 
restrictive way.
  
187 Essentially, the adverse impact of the conduct is weighed against 
its efficiency gains. In the EC, the inference of consumer harm tends to be drawn 
from evidence of distortion or hindrance of the competitive process.188
The ECJ has explained that the very presence of a dominant firm weakens 
competition in the relevant market and that the firm trespasses when it engages in 
competition other than on the merits such that the already weakened competition on 
the market is hindered.
  
189 This further distortion of competition is considered to be 
inherently harmful to consumers. While the concepts behind the US and EC tests in 
this respect may be similar, in practice they are applied differently. The US court are 
more concerned with the quantifiable effects of the conduct on competition while EC 
courts have tended to find the relevant harm on the basis of some impairing or 
undermining of competition without attempting to explain the extent of the effect.190
The Competition Tribunal has shown a tendency to adopt tests applied by foreign 
courts without explanation as to why such tests are appropriate in the context of 
South African law. It is important to note that injury to, or unfair treatment of a 
dominant firm’s rival per se is not sufficient to demonstrate anti-competitive 
effect.
  
191 Second, proof of harm to consumer welfare is sufficient to establish anti-
competitive effect.192 However, proof of harm to consumer welfare is not necessarily 
essential: the significant or substantial foreclosure of a market to the dominant firm’s 
rivals will give rise to an inference of anti-competitive effect.193
                                                          
186 Ibid. 
 Three areas continue 
187 Ibid. 
188 Ibid. 
189 Hoffman-La Roche & Co AG v Commission supra. 
190 British Airways plc v Commission supra paras 271, 286, 288. 
191 Msomi v British American Tobacco South Africa (Pty) Ltd CT 49/IR/Jul02 par 59. 
192 Competition Commission v South Africa Airways (Pty) Ltd supra para 132. 
193 Ibid. 
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to lack clarity, namely, whether it is also necessary to show that the conduct creates, 
extends or maintains market power; what is necessary to demonstrate significant or 
substantial foreclosure; and what is necessary to establish anti-competitive effect 
based on consequences in a second, non-dominated market.194
The judicial pronouncements on the meaning of anti-competitive effect in South 
Africa have lacked direction. In the case of York Timbers Ltd v South African 
Forestry Company Ltd
 The answers to these 
questions can be traced through South African law.  
195, the Competition Tribunal applied the tests propounded for 
the US offence of monopolisation. Accordingly, the Tribunal held that the element of 
anti-competitive effect required the complainant to demonstrate that the respondent’s 
“market power has been created or extended in consequence of the alleged act”.196
In Msomi v British American Tobacco South Africa, the Tribunal noted that the 
effect of the respondent’s conduct may be that certain firms will no longer be viable 
in the “market” but that this alone could not constitute an exclusionary act.
 
No explanation was proffered as to why such a test should be adopted in South 
Africa. On appeal, the Competition Appeal Court (CAC) reinforced the Tribunal’s 
approach to anti-competitive effect, holding that the appellant had failed to show the 
necessary anti-competitive consequences.  
197 In 
Competition Commission v Patensie Sitrus Beherend Beperk, the Tribunal seemed to 
follow its now overruled approach of not requiring any demonstration of anti-
competitive effect under s 8(d).198
“the concept of abuse is an objective concept relating to behaviour of an 
undertaking in a dominant position which is such as to influence the 
structure of the market where, as a result of the very presence of the 
undertaking in question, the degree of competition is weakened and which, 
through methods different from those which condition normal competition 
in products or services on the basis of the transactions of commercial 
operators, has the effect of hindering the maintenance of the degree of 
 On appeal, the CAC did not comment on this, but 
in considering whether an abuse has been perpetrated, it cited the decision of the ECJ 
in Hoffman-La Roche & Co AG v Commission which is quoted as follows: 
                                                          
194 Sutherland (note 164) at pg 7-50. 
195 No 15/IR/Feb01. 
196 Paras 93-100. 
197 CT 49/IR/Jul02 para59. 
198 No 37/CR/Jun01 para 9.5. 
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competition still existing in the market or the growth of that competition”199
In the most recent case of abuse of dominance, Competition Commission v South 
Africa Airways (Pty) Ltd
 
200
“(i) evidence of actual harm to consumer welfare or 
, the Tribunal engaged in a lengthy discussion of foreign 
case law on the meaning of anti-competitive effect. The Tribunal arrived at the 
conclusion that anti-competitive effect is present if there is: 
 (ii) if the exclusionary act is substantial or significant in terms of its effect in 
foreclosing the market to rivals”201
The Tribunal noted that direct evidence of harm to consumer welfare was not a 
necessity but that harm to structure suffices to show an infringement of the Act.
 
202 It 
is argued that where there is no evidence of consumer harm, a demonstration of 
substantial foreclosure would be required.203
No reason has been advanced by the South African courts to limit the effect of 
the words “anti-competitive” to the concept of creating, enhancing, or preserving the 
market power of the dominant firm.
  
204 Nothing in the language of s 8 confines the 
meaning of the phrase. Section 8(c) and (d) require the complainant to demonstrate 
the anti-competitive effect flowing from the exclusionary act in question. The 
language adopted by the Tribunal in the Competition Commission case by contrast 
comes directly from US commentary.205 This is problematic because s 2 of the 
Sherman Act which the Tribunal has borrowed its language from deals with 
monopolization while there is no reference to such concept under the South African 
Act. It is argued that this is not to say that South African Courts may not ultimately 
determine that US anti-competitive effect in the South African context requires a 
demonstration of US style “monopolization”.206
                                                          
199 Sutherland (note 164) at pg 7-51. 
 It is argued that such a principle 
should only be adopted on the basis of sound and thorough reasoning within the 
context of the South African Act, having particular regard to the purposes of the Act 
200 18/CR/Mar01. 
201 Ibid para 132. 
202 Ibid para 131. 
203 Ibid para 136. 
204 Sutherland (note 164) at para 7-52. 
205 Ibid. 
206 Ibid at para 7-53. 
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and their application in this country’s economic and legal context, which differs 
markedly to those of both of the EC and the US.207
3.2. Technological, Efficiency or other Pro-Competitive Gains 
  
According to s 8, even if the conduct of the dominant firm creates an anti-
competitive effect, that conduct might still be justified if it was necessary to create 
some technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive gains that outweigh its anti-
competitive effect. It is the proof of pro-competitive gains that may show the 
respondent’s conduct to be vigorous competition rather than an abuse of dominance. 
Any pro-competitive gain pleaded by the respondent must be directly related to, and 
dependent upon, the conduct under investigation such that the gains could not 
otherwise be achieved –it is the sine qua non.208 If there are non-infringing 
alternatives that can achieve the effect, the gain will be rejected.209
The pro-competitive gains must be weighed against the anti-competitive effect of 
the act. These gains and effects will most often be conceptual rather than directly 
quantifiable: it is always difficult to establish just how much of a financial effect is 
attributable to a certain act.
  
210 While the CAC has held that it is competition and not 
customers that must benefit from the conduct, it is argued that the better view is 
probably that the extent of benefit to the relevant customers should be weighed 
against harm to other participants in the market.211 It is also argued that the courts 
should take into account a dynamic view of the market.212 While it may seem fitting 
to force a dominant firm to make certain supplies or concessions to its rival on a 
static view of the market, the court should consider whether such an order would 
ultimately harm the market by removing the incentive for dominant firms to make 
beneficial investments.213
It will be appropriate to place my discussion on exclusionary conduct as done 
earlier with the US and EU approaches into context by assessing how the general 
clause in s 8 has been applied in practical terms by the Court in terms of refusals to 
  
                                                          
207 Ibid. 
208 Patensie Sitrus (note 171) at para 30. 
209 Ibid at para 32. 
210 Sutherland (note 164) at pg 7-58. 
211 Patensie (note 171) at 32. 
212 Op cit note Sutherland at 210. 
213 Ibid. 
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deal in s 8(d)(i). 
3.3. Refusals to Deal under the South African Competition Act 
      To succeed in a claim of refusal to deal under the South African provision, the 
complainant must prove that the respondent is a dominant firm, the respondent 
required or induced a supplier or customer not to deal with a competitor and the act 
had an anti-competitive effect.214
      The Competition Tribunal’s most detailed analysis of the abuse provisions to date 
concerned a case of inducement not to deal in Competition Commission v South 
African Airways (SAA) (Pty) Ltd.
 The respondent in defence can show that the pro-
competitive gains outweigh the anti-competitive effect.  
215 The case concerned the legality of two incentive 
schemes which the respondent, SAA, South Africa’s largest domestic airline had 
with two travel agents. The commission alleged that the incentives constituted an 
abuse of dominance designed to exclude or impede SAA’s rivals in the domestic 
airline market.216 The first consideration for the Tribunal was to identify the relevant 
market. In this case, there were two possible relevant markets which were 
interdependent, the travel agency sales domestic travel market and the market for 
domestic airline travel.217 The Tribunal found that both markets existed and after 
having considered whether SAA met the dominance percentage as prescribed by the 
Act, it found that the SAA was dominant in both markets.218 The Tribunal found that 
there is nothing in the Act that suggests that an abuse of dominance cannot be 
perpetrated in one market and the effect experienced in another related market.219
      To determine abuse as stated earlier, there must be a violation of Section 8 and in 
this case, the commission alleged a violation of s 8(c) and (d) (i). The court found 
that the onus of proof of the s 8(d) was on the respondent while the complainant bore 
the onus to negate in s 8(c).
  
220
                                                          
214 Ibid at pg 7-59. 
  
215 18/CR/Mar01. 
216 Ibid para 1. 
217 Ibid para 33. 
218 Ibid para 94. 
219 Ibid para 36. 
220 Ibid para 99. 
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      The next question that the Tribunal had to consider was whether an exclusionary 
act could be presumed to have an anti-competitive effect. This question was quite an 
important one since both the USA and the EU had different approaches to this 
question. It is useful to consider the approach of these two competition giants while 
evaluating the South African approach. To answer this question, the Tribunal 
considered the purpose of abuse of dominance prohibition under the Act. It identified 
two species of abuse of dominance. The one kind termed exploitative abuse focuses 
on the effect of the abuse on the consumer who in consequence of the output 
decisions of the dominant firm may be facing output constraining behaviour which 
leads to higher prices.221 The other kind is an abuse that has an exclusionary effect 
which is conduct that excludes growth of rivals in the market.222
      Two positions have emerged in the USA on the first kind of abuse of dominance. 
The first approach is said to be favoured by the proponents of the Chicago school 
which requires that there must be a showing of harm to consumer welfare in order to 
make a conduct unlawful.
    
223 Absent such a showing, these proponents contend that 
there is a danger that the courts will mistake protecting competitor benefits for 
consumer welfare.224 The US Court of Appeals in the Virgin Atlantic v British 
Airways225 case supported this approach. This case is similar to the South African 
Competition Commission v SAA case as it also dealt with an alleged abuse of 
dominance by an airline, British Airways, engaging in predatory business practice 
through the use of incentive agreements with travel agencies to stifle competition. 
Virgin Airways alleged that the incentive agreements by British Airways offered 
below cost pricing and thus attracted passengers to British Airway’s transatlantic 
flights and losses from these low cost pricing were recouped from flights were 
British Airways exercised monopoly power and could charge higher fares.226
                                                          
221 Ibid para 114. 
 The net 
effect according to Virgin Airways was to impede Virgin Airway’s efforts to expand 
its service. The court in this case held that for Virgin Airways to show that British 
222 Ibid para 115. 
223 Ibid para 118. 
224 Chang, Evans and Shumalensee, ‘Has the Consumer harm standard lost its teeth? High Stakes 
AntiTrust The last Hurrah?’ Brookings Joint Centre for Regulatory Studies USA. 
225 U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals 99-9402. 
226 Ibid pg 3. 
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Airways engaged in an unreasonable restraint of trade, it had to ultimately show that 
British Airway’s actions had a competition-reducing effect harming consumers.227
      The second approach is to find liability if there is evidence that the exclusionary 
behaviour will lead to substantial market foreclosure.
  
228 Writers who support this 
approach are concerned that if harm to consumer welfare were the standard, 
competition law would be under-deterrent because evidence of harm to consumer 
welfare is difficult to prove.229 This approach finds favour from Fishman v Wertz230
      This second approach is consistent with the position of the EU. According to 
Soames, the European Commission is more willing to assume harm based on 
potential adverse effects on a competitive process that is perceived to have long run 
benefits.
 
where the court held that competition law protects competition and the competition 
process, not results.  
231 In other words, there is a tendency to protect the structure of competition 
in the market rather than protect against losses to consumer welfare in the short 
term.232 This is based on the belief that harm to the competitive process will 
indirectly cause anticompetitive harm.233 This was the position of the European 
Court of Justice in the case of British Airways v Commission of the European 
Communities.234 This case is also similar to the South African and America Airline 
cases as it concerned an allegation of abuse of dominance by Virgin Airways that 
British Airways was using marketing and incentive agreements with travel agents to 
distort competition. The Commission for European Communities agreed that British 
Airways abused its dominant position in the United Kingdom market for air travel 
agency services which had an effect of distorting competition between British 
Airways and other airlines on the United Kingdom markets for air transport 
services.235
                                                          
227 Ibid pg 8. 
  
228 Op cit note 215 at para 121 
229 Ibid. 
230 Ibid para 123. 
231 Trevor Soames ‘Towards a “smart” Article 82’ Fordham 32nd Conf. on International Antitrust Law 
and Policy, para 4.23 pg 20. 
232 Ibid. 
233 Ibid. 
234 First Chamber Case T-219/99. 
235 Ibid para 24 & 26. 
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      The Court of the European Communities held on appeal that the BA could not 
accuse the commission of failing to demonstrate that its practices produced an 
exclusionary effect. According to the Court, for the purposes of establishing an 
infringement under Art 82 of the European Community Treaty prohibiting abuse of 
dominance, it is not necessary to demonstrate the abuse in question had a concrete 
effect on the markets concerned.236 It is sufficient in that respect to demonstrate that 
the abusive conduct of the undertaking in a dominant position tends to restrict 
competition, or in other words, that the conduct is capable of having or likely to have 
such an effect.237
      According to Eleanor Fox, what the Courts are doing when they find behaviour 
to be anti-competitive in the absence of harm to the consumer is essentially 
consciously or sometimes unconsciously making inferences of fact and law and 
sometimes, mixed fact and law to arrive at findings of competitive harm by way of 
proxy.
  
238 She goes on further to state that Courts may find as a matter of fact that a 
business practice is exclusionary and the practice has the potential to foreclose the 
market for competitors of the dominant firm.239 As a matter of inference according to 
her, Courts may find that there is a likelihood of competition being foreclosed and 
such foreclosure will have an adverse impact on competition.240
      In light of the consideration from the American and European jurisdiction, the 
Tribunal in South Africa adopted the following approach; it concluded that an anti-
competitive effect is different from an exclusionary act.
 Such inference 
according to Fox is legal.  
241 To determine whether an 
exclusionary act has an anti-competitive effect, the question will be answered in the 
affirmative if there is (1) evidence of actual harm to consumer welfare or (2) if the 
exclusionary act is substantial or significant in terms of its effect in foreclosing the 
market to rivals.242
                                                          
236 Ibid para 293. 
 According to the Tribunal, the latter conclusion is factual and 
237 Ibid. 
238 Fox ‘What is harm to Competition? Exclusionary Practices and Anti-Competitive Effect’ 70 Anti-
Trust L.J. 371.  
239 Ibid. 
240 Ibid. 
241 Competition Commission case para 136. 
242 Ibid para 132. 
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partly based on reasonable inferences drawn from proven facts.243 If the answer to 
the question is affirmative, according to the Tribunal, it can conclude that the 
conduct will have an anti-competitive effect and whether the anti-competitive effect 
is based on actual harm or likely foreclosure, there is evidence of a quantitative 
nature that can allow a measurement against the efficiency justification clause in s 
8(d).244
      It is argued that the South African Courts should avoid taking a mechanistic view 
of foreclosure based on percentages of the market foreclosed, and instead focus on 
the likely effect of the exclusion of the dominant firm’s rivals and, in particular, 
whether there is any genuine pro-competitive explanation for the exclusion.
  
245
      From the discussion in this paper so far, it can be established that the South 
African approach to exclusionary conduct has been a hybrid approach combining 
both the American and the European approaches to exclusionary conduct in abuse of 
dominance. Proponents of the European approach rejected the American approach of 
proof of adverse effect to the consumer as too strict and difficult to prove. South 
Africa’s hybrid approach of proof of adverse effect or likelihood of foreclosing 
competition is an attempt at playing safe the game of regulation by pleasing both the 
big firms who advocate the American approach and those who argue that the Courts 
should develop the law in line with the conservative objectives of the Competition 
Act of 1998. Such an approach is simply not favourable for developing economies as 
it allows the possibility of dominant firms to get away with exclusionary practices 
should they successfully convince a Court that the facts of a particular case warrant 
adopting the approach of proof of adverse effect to the consumer.  
  
      Having discussed the tests for exclusionary practices in detail, it is appropriate to 
discuss the practical application. This thesis acknowledges that competition law is 
still foreign to African economies and makes the argument for the adoption of 
competition law on a regional level to police the largely unregulated African market 
where cartels are free to engage in exclusionary practices at will and national 
governments lack the resources or will to adopt competition law on a national level. 
This thesis studies the extraterritorial application of competition law in the EU and 
                                                          
243 Ibid. 
244 Ibid. 
245 Sutherland (note 164) at pg 7-63 
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USA to advance the argument that if competition laws are adopted as already done in 
COMESA on a regional level, such laws can function effectively using the 
extraterritoriality rule. The applicability of this rule is discussed in the next chapter. 
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                                                        Chapter 4   
                                          The Extraterritoriality Rule 
4.1. International Public Law on Extraterritoriality 
      The limits upon a State’s jurisdictional competence and therefore upon its ability 
to apply its competition laws to overseas undertakings are matters of public 
international law. There are two elements to a State’s jurisdictional competence. 
First, a State has jurisdiction to make laws through its arms of government and this is 
known as a State’s subject-matter jurisdiction.246 Secondly, a State has jurisdiction to 
enforce its laws and this is referred to as enforcement jurisdiction.247 Based on the 
principles of nationality and territoriality, the extraterritorial application of 
competition rules is ensured through the use of three legal constructs, namely the 
economic entity doctrine, the implementation doctrine and the effects doctrine.248
      The nationality principle enables national legislatures and courts to have 
jurisdiction over their citizens whether juristic or natural persons concerning illegal 
acts abroad.
 
The former two doctrines are established under the EC law and in the absence of 
formal recognition by the ECJ, the status of the effects doctrine remains unresolved.   
249 The territoriality principle provides that national legislatures and 
courts have jurisdiction to regulate acts which originated and/or was completed 
within their own territory whether committed by citizens or foreigners.250 The 
rationale for this is that a country where the illegal act is committed has the strongest 
interest in prosecuting or obtaining recompense from those responsible. The 
territoriality principle has been extended to acts which originate within its territory, 
that is subjective territoriality and acts which originated abroad but completed within 
its territory, which is objective territoriality.251
      The principles of nationality and territoriality have implications for the 
applicability of competition law in the US and the doctrines of economic entity, 
  
                                                          
246 Richard Whish, The international dimension of competition law, Competition Law (6th Ed), (2008) 
Oxford University Press chapter 12 at pg 472. 
247 Ibid. 
248 Geradin, Reysen and Henry, ‘Extraterritoriality, Comity and Cooperation in EC Competition Law’ 
pg 1. 
249 Op cit note Whish at 246.  
250 Ibid. 
251 Ibid. 
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implementation and effects are also relevant. For instance, the idea of objective 
territoriality can be applied to the effects of an agreement entered into or an anti-
competitive act committed in another State.252 The effects doctrine has been 
embraced in the USA in the case of United States v Aluminium Co of America where 
the Court held that it is settled law that any State may impose liabilities even upon 
persons not within its allegiance for conduct outside its borders which has 
consequences within its borders which the State reprehends.253 Some US Courts 
drawing on the principle of judicial comity have attempted to apply the effects 
doctrine in a relatively restrictive way, requiring not only that there should be a direct 
and substantial effect within the US, but also that the respective interests of the 
United States in asserting jurisdiction of other States which might be offended by 
such assertion would be weighed against one another.254 Various factors relevant to 
comity analysis include255
• the relative significance of the alleged violation of the conduct within the US 
as compared to conduct abroad 
  
•  the nationality of the persons involved or affected by the conduct 
•  the presence or absence of an intention to affect US consumers, markets or 
exporters 
•  the relative significance and forseeability of the effects on the US compared 
to the effects abroad 
•  the existence of reasonable expectations that would be furthered or defeated 
by the action 
•  the degree of conflict with foreign law or articulated by foreign economic 
policies 
• the extent to which the enforcement activities of another country may be 
affected and the effectiveness of foreign as opposed to US enforcement.  
                                                          
252 Ibid. 
253 148 F.2d 416 (2nd Circuit 1945), pg 444. 
254 Fox ‘ Reasonableness and Extraterritoriality’ (1986) Fordham Corporate Law Institute Journal, pg 
49. 
255 The DoJ/FTC International Guidelines, para 3.2. 
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      The principle of comity has also been recognised by the European Court of First 
Instance in Gencor v Commission case.256
4.2. Extraterritorial Application of US Competition Law 
 I will first discuss the extraterritorial 
application in the US and EU jurisdictions for referral purposes before discussing the 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Competition 
Regulation which is the relevant legislation for the analysis in this section. 
      In the American Banana v United Fruit Company257 case, the defendant, a US 
corporation engaged in all sorts of anti-competitive acts in Latin America for several 
years which essentially gave it monopoly over the US banana market. The plaintiff 
who was also a US corporation then entered into the banana market but the defendant 
tried to force it into complying with its monopoly practices which was essentially 
cartel behaviour but the plaintiff refused. The defendant then conspired to drive 
plaintiff out of business by persuading the government of Costa Rica to take over the 
plaintiff’s land and the plaintiff reacted by bringing a Sherman Act claim to a US 
Court. The court held that there is a presumption that all legislation is prima facie 
territorial and the general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as 
lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the 
act is done.258 The court further said, “for another jurisdiction, if it should happen to 
lay hold of the actor, to treat him according to its own notions rather than those of the 
place where he did the acts, not only would be unjust, but would be an interference 
with the authority of another sovereign, contrary to the comity of nations, which the 
other State concerned justly might resent”.259
      In the Alcoa case, the issue was whether US antitrust laws could impose liability 
upon foreign companies who concluded agreements outside US that violated US 
antitrust laws. The court held that the US has jurisdiction where there’s both intent to 
affect US commerce and actual effect.
  
260
                                                          
256 [1999] ECR II-753 (CFI). 
 It appears that the requirement of intent to 
affect and actual effect must both be present for jurisdiction to exist. The decision of 
the court in Alcoa which extended the jurisdiction of the court for conduct outside its 
257 213 U.S. 347 (1909). 
258 Ibid. 
259 Ibid. 
260 Note 256. 
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borders which has consequences within its borders was a significant departure from 
the American Banana case. 
       In the Hartford Fire Insurance Co v California261 case, there was a group of 
foreign and domestic companies engaged in various conspiracies to affect the 
American Insurance market. The question before the court was whether the principle 
of international comity requires US courts to refrain from exercising jurisdiction over 
certain claims against foreign companies under the Sherman Act. The court 
reaffirmed the decision of Alcoa and stated also that no comity conflict exists “where 
a person subject to regulation by two states can comply with the laws of both States 
even if one law is more onerous than the other and the State with the less restrictive 
law objects.”262 In a dissenting opinion, Judge Scalia stated that comity is a 
presumptive interpretive rule to be applied by courts when considering the legislative 
intent behind an Act with regard to extra territorial application.263 It is not an 
invitation for the courts to practice “adjudicative comity”.264
      In the case of Hoffman-La Roche v Empagran
  
265, a claim was brought under the 
Sherman Act by a mix of US and foreign parties alleging harm suffered in US and 
abroad from a price fixing scheme of a vitamins cartel. The court had to consider an 
application of the Foreign Trade Amendment Act 1982. The question before the 
court was whether foreigners who suffer harm in foreign countries as a result of 
violations of US antitrust laws can sue for damages in US courts? The court 
concluded that as plaintiffs had suffered harm not in the US but in Ukraine, Panama, 
Australia and Ecuador, they could not sue in the US.266 The court however left open 
the question of whether the foreign plaintiffs could sue in the US if the foreign injury 
that they had suffered was inseparable from the domestic harm caused by the cartel 
to customers in the US.267
                                                          
261 509 US 764 (1993). 
 The court further held that the Sherman Act and the 
Foreign Trade Amendment Act cannot apply because Courts should ordinarily 
262 Ibid. 
263 ibid pg 800.   
264 Ibid. 
265 542 US 155, (2004) . 
266 Ibid. 
267 Ibid pg 7. 
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construe statutes to avoid unreasonable interference with sovereign authority of other 
nations.268
4.3. The Extraterritorial Application of European Community(EC) 
Competition Law 
  
      Many non-EC undertakings have been held to have infringed competition rules. 
The court of justice has not yet ruled specifically whether there is an effects doctrine 
under EC law since it has always been possible in cases under Art 81 and 82 to base 
jurisdiction on other grounds such as the economic entity doctrine.269
      The Dyestuffs
 In the Dyestuffs 
and Wood Pulp cases, the question of whether EC law should recognise the effects 
doctrine was argued at length but the ECJ was able to avoid pronouncement on the 
issue. 
270 case represents the decisive EC case as far as the economic 
entity doctrine is concerned. On the basis of the nationality principle, jurisdiction 
was asserted over non-EC parent undertakings by attributing liability to them for the 
illegal price fixing of dyestuffs by their subsidiaries located in the EC over which the 
non-EC parent undertaking exercised control.271 Objection was raised to the 
commission’s jurisdiction on the basis that a parent company with offices outside the 
community should not be liable for fines solely by reason of effects produced within 
the community by actions taken outside the community. It was argued that conduct 
should be attributed to a subsidiary company within the community and not the 
parent company outside the community. The court came to the conclusion that the 
fact that a subsidiary has separate legal personality is not sufficient to exclude the 
possibility of imputing its conduct to the parent company.272 Where a subsidiary does 
not enjoy real autonomy in determining its course of action in the market, the 
prohibitions may be considered inapplicable in the relationship between it and the 
parent company with which it forms one economic unit.273
                                                          
268 Ibid pg 6. 
 According to the 
Dyestuffs line of case law, the crux of the issue is to check the extent to which a non-
269 Whish (note 246) at pg 478. 
270 1972 (ECR) 619 . 
271 Geradin (note 243) at pg 4. 
272 Note 270 at para 132. 
273 Ibid para 134. 
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EC parent undertaking controls its subsidiaries located in the EC in order to establish 
a single economic entity.274
      The implementation doctrine represents an alternative legal construct as far as the 
extraterritorial application of EC competition law is concerned, its advent reflecting 
the inherent limitations of the economic entity doctrine because it could not be 
stretched to catch purely non-European players.
  
275 This doctrine is based on the 
territoriality principle and practices fall within Article 81 and 82 irrespective of the 
geographic origin provided they are implemented within the European 
Community.276
      In the Wood Pulp case, the jurisdiction of the commission was again objected to 
on the basis that no price-fixing agreement was concluded within the EC and 
companies alleged to have engaged in price fixing were all located outside the EC.
  
277 
The commission in finding that there was a concerted practice between undertakings 
in several non-EC countries held that jurisdiction could be based on the effects of the 
concerted practice in the EC.278 The court however also held that on the facts of the 
case, the agreement had been implemented within the EC and it was unnecessary to 
have recourse to the effects doctrine.279 The court held that object and effect of 
agreement was to restrict competition within the EC because where non-EC 
producers sell to EC buyers at pre-fixed prices, agreement is implemented within the 
EC.280 The court stated that the exercise of the commission’s jurisdiction was 
consistent with the territoriality principle as it was triggered by the implementation 
of the agreement within the EC.281
      The court further held that  
  
“It should be observed that an infringement of Article [81], such as the 
conclusion of an agreement which has had the effect of restricting 
competition within the common market, consists of conduct made up of 
two elements, the formation of the agreement, decision or concerted 
practice and the implementation thereof. If the applicability of 
                                                          
274 Geradin (note 248) at pg 5. 
275 Ibid. 
276 Ibid. 
277 (1988) 4 CMLR 901. 
278 Ibid paras 11-23. 
279 Ibid. 
280 Ibid. 
281 Ibid. 
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prohibitions laid down under competition law were made to depend on 
the place where the agreement, decision or concerted practice was 
formed, the result would obviously be to give undertakings an easy 
means of evading those prohibitions. The decisive factor is therefore the 
place where it is implemented. The producers in this case implemented 
their pricing agreement within the common market. It is immaterial in 
that respect whether or not they had recourse to subsidiaries, agents, sub-
agents, or branches within the Community in order to make their contacts 
with purchasers within the Community. Accordingly the Community’s 
jurisdiction to apply its competition rules to such conduct is covered by 
the territoriality principle as universally recognized in public 
international law”.282
 
  
The adoption of the effects doctrine was however supported in the Wood Pulp case in 
the opinion of Advocate Darmon who stated that  
“a State has jurisdiction to prescribe rules of law governing conduct that 
takes place outside its territory and causes an effect within its territory 
provided that three conditions are satisfied: (a) the conduct and its effect 
are constituent elements of a restrictive practice, (b) the effect within the 
territory is substantial, and (c) it occurs as a direct and primarily intended 
result of the conduct outside the territory.”283
 
  
      According to Wood Pulp, therefore, the criterion as to the implementation of an 
agreement is satisfied by mere sale within the community and the jurisdiction of the 
community will be triggered.  
      Though the effects doctrine has been recognised and accepted by the 
commission, there has been no explicit judgment affirming the doctrine. In the 
Gencor v Commission case, the territorial scope of the European Community Merger 
Regulation (ECMR )vis-à-vis a proposed concentration notified by undertakings 
whose registered offices and mining operations were outside the community was at 
issue.284
                                                          
282 Ibid paras 16-18. 
 Gencor had objected that the Commission did not have jurisdiction under 
the ECMR to prohibit activities in South Africa especially where those activities 
were approved by the government of South Africa. The commission had prohibited 
the merger on the basis that it would have created a dominant duopoly as result of 
which effective competition would be significantly impeded in the common 
283 Ibid para 57. 
284 (1999) ECR II-753, para 90. 
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market.285 The Court held that on the territorial scope of the ECMR, the Wood Pulp 
judgment requiring implementation within the community did not contradict the 
commission’s assertion of jurisdiction in this case.286 The court also held that the 
application of the ECMR was justified where the proposed merger will have an 
immediate and substantial effect within the community.287
      There has been significant resistance to extraterritoriality by a number of 
jurisdictions. The US Alcoa case set off a number of governmental reactions which 
objected to the extraterritorial application of US antitrust laws.
 This judgment is of 
immense significance because the court also did not adopt the effects doctrine since 
it determined the subject-matter jurisdiction on the basis of turnover thresholds in the 
ECMR and equated them to the implementation doctrine in the Wood Pulp case.  
288 Several countries 
have passed blocking statues whereby they attempt to thwart excessive assumptions 
of jurisdiction. It must be remembered though that States have no power to block 
subject matter jurisdiction of other countries. There are no provisions in EC law 
which have this effect.289 The commission considers that this is essentially a matter 
for the governments of the individual member states.290 The United Kingdom (UK) 
has been the most vocal objector to extraterritorial jurisdiction. The UK Protection of 
Trading Interests Act291
      There have been a considerable number of internationalization efforts largely 
through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Developments (OECD) and 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). There have also 
been some bilateral and regional international cooperation agreements mostly among 
developed countries. I believe that the internationalization efforts in competition law 
should also be extended to Africa in an age where there are increasing numbers of 
multinational institutions operating across the continent with most African countries 
ill-equipped to regulate the activities of these companies. It is suggested that as long 
as competition laws cannot be implemented successfully at the national levels due to 
 is a blocking statute that applies in any case in which foreign 
law is being applied in a way that could harm UK’s commercial interests.   
                                                          
285 Ibid para 96. 
286 Ibid paras 78-82. 
287 Ibid. 
288 Whish (note 246) at pg 487. 
289 Ibid. 
290 Ibid. 
291 1980. 
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lack of resources, and in order to ensure stability on the continent where companies 
are becoming more dominant and foreign investment keeps flowing in, competition 
law should be regulated on a regional level. Such a law if adopted on a regional level 
can only apply and be effective if it has extraterritorial application. These raises 
questions such as how enforcement efforts of various jurisdictions will be 
coordinated and how jurisdictional and policy conflicts between countries will be 
addressed. The rest of this section will be devoted to exploring the solutions to these 
questions. I will use COMESA’s attempts at regulating competition law on a regional 
level as a case study in making my recommendations. 
4.4. Competition Cooperation in the COMESA Regional Trade Agreement  
      Of all the regional trade groupings of developing countries, COMESA is 
probably the most advanced in the provision of a framework for cross-border and 
international cooperation in competition matters through its formulation and adoption 
of a regional competition policy and law, even though the competition authority to 
implement that policy and law is still to be established.292 The regional competition 
law was formulated and adopted in accordance with the provisions of Article 55 of 
the COMESA Treaty, which prohibits any practice which negates the objective of 
free and liberalised trade, including “any agreement between undertakings or 
concerted practice which has as its objective or effect the prevention, restriction or 
distortion of competition within the Common Market”. It also provides for the 
adoption of regulations aimed at regulating competition within the member States. 
Competition rules were adopted by the Council of Ministers in 2004. Current 
members of the bloc include Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo (DR 
Congo), Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe.293
      The preamble to the COMESA Competition Regulations clearly spells out the 
broad objectives and aims of the regional competition law in addressing competition 
 
                                                          
292 UNCTAD 2006 ‘Analysis of cooperation and dispute settlement mechanisms relating to 
competition policy in regional free trade agreements, taking into account issues of particular concern 
to small and developing countries.’ Available at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/wcmu/docs/c2clp_ige7p1_en.pdf (accessed on 15th June 2009) pg 4. 
293 Briefing paper ‘Taking the Right Steps Competition Administration in Eastern & Southern Africa.’ 
Available at http://www.cuts-ccier.org/7up3/pdf/BriefingPaper01-2008.pdf [accessed on 15th June]. 
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concerns of a cross-border nature. The preamble also recognizes the need for 
Member States to give effect to the principles of regional competition regulations 
and rules and to use moderation and self-discipline for co-operation in the field of 
anti-competitive business practices.294 It also indicates various forms of cooperation 
in areas such as: (i) elimination of restrictive business practices that affect trade 
between the member States; (ii) consultations and conciliation on matters related to 
anti-competitive practices affecting regional and international trade; (iii) notification, 
exchange of information, co-ordination of actions and consultation among member 
States in the enforcement of competition law; and (iv) relationship between national 
competition authorities and the regional authority.295 The Regulations goes on further 
to state the purpose of the regulations “to promote and encourage competition by 
preventing restrictive business practices and other restrictions that deter the efficient 
operation of markets, thereby enhancing the welfare of the consumers in the 
Common Market, and to protect consumers against offensive conduct by market 
actors”.296
      Interestingly, the COMESA competition regulations are based on the EC 
competition law regime but also on the domestic competition rules that already exist 
in some Member Countries, such as, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Zambia and Malawi.
  
297 The 
COMESA Regional Competition Policy is intended to harmonize existing national 
competition policies to avoid contradictions and provide a consistent regional 
economic environment. These Regulations apply to all economic activity conducted 
by both private and public entities within or having an effect within the common 
market except for those activities provided under Article 4.298
                                                          
294Preamble ‘COMESA Competition Regulations 2003.’ Available at 
 The Regulations cover 
all possible anti-competitive practices (inclusive of anti-competitive agreements, 
abuse of dominance, and anti-competitive mergers and acquisitions). Horizontal 
https://www.givengain.com/unique/tralac/pdf/Comesa_competition_regulations_feb2003.pdf 
[accessed on 15th June 2009]. 
295 UNCTAD 2006, (note 292). 
296 Article 2 of the COMESA Competition Regulations Treaty. 
297 Damien Geradin Competition Law and Regional Economic Integration: An analysis of the 
Southern Mediterranean Countries 2004 at 17. 
298 Art 4 lists the following exclusions: (a) arrangements for collective bargaining on behalf of 
employers and employees for the purpose of fixing terms and conditions of employment; (b) activities 
of trade unions and other associations directed at advancing the terms and conditions of employment 
of their members; (c) activities of professional associations designed to develop or enforce 
professional standards reasonably necessary for the protection of the public interest. 
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agreements between direct competitors are outrightly, or per se, prohibited under the 
Regulations.299
     Abuse of a dominant position is also prohibited under the Regulations as 
incompatible with the Common Market in so far as it may affect trade between 
Member States, if it: (i) restricts, or is likely to restrict, the entry of any undertaking 
into a market; (ii) prevents or deters, or is likely to prevent or deter, any undertaking 
from engaging in competition in a market; (iii) eliminates or removes, or is likely to 
eliminate or remove, any undertaking from a market; (iv) directly or indirectly 
imposes unfair purchase or selling prices or other restrictive practices; (v) limits the 
production of goods or services for a market to the prejudice of consumers; (vi) as a 
party to an agreement makes the conclusion of such agreement subject to acceptance 
by another party of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to 
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of the agreement; or (vii) 
engages in any business activity that results in the exploitation of its customers or 
suppliers, so as to frustrate the benefits expected from the establishment of the 
Common Market.
  
300
      The COMESA Competition Regulations therefore have adequate provisions to 
deal with exclusionary conduct and any anti-competitive practices that distort 
competition in the Common Market. In particular, the Regulations are geared to 
effectively deal with anti-competitive practices of multinational companies based in 
foreign countries but with subsidiaries operating in the Common Market.
 
301
      While efforts are currently being made at cooperation at bilateral level in the 
handling of competition cases with cross-border effects, these have been found not to 
be enough. For example, the global Coca-Cola/ Cadbury-Schweppes merger was 
examined by two countries in the region, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Even though the 
competition authorities of the two countries examined the merger separately in so far 
as it affected their respective markets, there was constant exchange of information on 
the common features of the transaction, such as the intentions of the merging parties 
and the possible effects on the relevant beverages markets, between the two 
 They are 
also geared to deal with global mergers, and even international cartels.  
                                                          
299 UNCTAD 2006, (note 292) at pg 5. 
300 Art 18(1) of the COMESA Competition Regulations Treaty. 
301 Op cit note 299. 
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authorities in order to ensure that the outcomes of their respective examinations did 
not adversely affect each other’s markets.302 The cooperation between the two 
competition authorities ensured that adequate conditions were placed on the approval 
of the merger in both countries. In the case of Zimbabwe, the merger was approved 
on condition that the local Cadbury-Schweppes bottling plant be modernised and 
used for empowerment purposes, and also that the local beverage brands, the Mazoe 
and Calypso brands owned by Cadbury-Schweppes, be developed into regional and 
international brands.303
      It is however known that the global merger not only affected Zambia and 
Zimbabwe in the COMESA region but also a number of other countries, who 
unfortunately were unable to examine the transaction because of a lack of national 
competition law and authority and thus did not have the opportunity of imposing 
developmental conditions on its approval.
  
304 A regional approach to the global 
merger could therefore have ensured maximum benefits to the whole region. It is 
also noted that with the progressive reduction and eventual elimination of tariffs in 
trade between COMESA member States, most trade disputes between member States 
will be related to non-tariff barriers to trade.305
 
 Since most, if not all, non-tariff 
barriers to trade are exclusionary in nature, it is submitted that such practices could 
effectively be dealt with under the abuse of dominance provisions of the COMESA 
Competition Regulations. 
4.4. Proposed Recommendations 
      COMESA’s efforts at regulating competition on a regional level must be 
applauded. It is no secret that virtually all member countries of COMESA are at a 
developmental state so far behind when comparing them to members of the EU. This 
poses different forms of challenges in regulating competition significantly different 
from the experiences in the EU. A challenge that will face COMESA unlike the EU 
is the current non existence of national competition legislation in some of the 
member countries. This gives rise to problems of implementation and enforcement 
which will severely handicap the effectiveness of the COMESA Competition 
                                                          
302 Ibid at pg 6. 
303 Ibid. 
304 Ibid. 
305 Ibid pg 7. 
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Regulations. It is recommended that while the adoption of the Regulation is a 
positive step in the right direction, it is very crucial that all member countries should 
ratify and adopt the treaty in order for it to be expressly binding and applicable in 
their respective national jurisdictions. Furthermore, a regional Competition 
Commission with supra national powers similar to institutions established by the 
African Union should be established to carry out enforcement measures based on the 
regulations. Such a commission will be able to overcome institutional difficulties in 
enforcing competition laws such as excessive bureaucracy, corruption and lack of 
transparency, lack of resources and professional expertise within the competition 
authority.  
      I recognise the fact that there may be a potential problem whereby a conflict 
arises between economic policies of different countries and the commission has to 
make a decision on a conduct that affects multiple countries which is acceptable in 
one country and not the other. Such a situation will have to be dealt with on a case by 
case basis with the need for member countries to be proactive in their cooperation on 
competition related matters. It will also be helpful if the commission can be endowed 
with conciliatory powers to sanction supervised talks in cases such as this between 
member countries to resolve such conflicts. It is only when conciliatory efforts fail 
should the commission make decisions that are tailor made in such a way that the 
policies of the countries involved are respected based on the principles of comity 
earlier discussed in this chapter.  
      Also, taking into consideration my earlier discussion on extraterritoriality in the 
USA and EC in this section, significant hurdles that a competition law with a 
regional scope can overcome will involve the adoption of the implementation and the 
effects doctrine as suggested by Advocate Darmon in the Wood Pulp case. It is only 
then that the true efficiency benefits of the competition regulations can be fully 
maximised. 
      A vital question to consider next is how public interest should play a role in 
developing a suitable approach to exclusionary practices in abuse of dominance. 
South Africa will be used as case study again. This is necessary considering the fact 
that efficiency justifications serve as a defence for exclusionary practices and there 
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are conflicting interests between the objectives of efficiency and the objectives of 
public interest in South Africa’s Competition Act. 
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                                                   Chapter 5 
                                     The Role of Public Interest 
      The preamble of the Competition Act recognises that South Africa’s 
discriminatory past resulted in a skewed distribution of ownership and control, 
inadequate restraint on anti-competitive trade practices and unjust restrictions on full 
and free participation in the economy by all South Africans.306 It acknowledges that 
the economy should be open to greater ownership by a greater number of South 
Africans and that a credible competition law and effective structures to administer 
that law are necessary for an efficient functioning economy.307 It stresses that “an 
efficient, competitive economic environment, balancing the interest of workers, 
owners and consumers and focused on development” will benefit all South 
Africans.308
      The preamble of the Competition Act states that the Act is enacted to:  
  
1. provide all South Africans equal opportunity to participate fairly in the 
national economy;  
2. achieve a more effective and efficient economy in South Africa; 
3. provide for markets in which consumers have access to, and can freely select, 
the quality and variety of goods and services they desire; 
4. create greater capability and an environment for South Africans to compete 
effectively in international markets; 
5. restrain particular trade practices which undermine a competitive economy; 
6. regulate the transfer of economic ownership in keeping the public interest;  
7. establish independent institutions to monitor economic competition;    
      The overall purpose of the Competition Act is to promote and maintain 
competition, in order  
‘(a) to promote the efficiency, adaptability and development of the economy;  
 (b) to provide consumers with competitive prices and product choices;  
                                                          
306 Preamble to the Competition Act of 1998. 
307 Sutherland (note 164) at pg 4-3. 
308 Ibid. 
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 (c) to promote employment and advance the social and economic welfare of South 
Africans;  
(d) to expand opportunities for South African participation in world markets and 
recognise the role of foreign competition in the Republic;  
(e) to ensure that small and medium-sized enterprises have an equitable opportunity 
to participate in the economy; and  
(f) to promote a greater spread of ownership, in particular to increase the ownership 
stakes of historically disadvantaged persons.’309
      Academic scholars argue that it will be difficult to balance the equitable goals of 
the Competition Act (the Act) with the objectives of efficiency also listed in the 
purpose of the Act. Many competition lawyers have been critical of the notion that 
competition law should protect small undertakings and promote the spread of 
ownership as this may undermine efficiency.
  
310 They claim that increases or 
decreases in competition depend on the efficiency of firms in a particular market and 
not on the size or large number of these firms.311 The notion that competition law 
should assist in redressing the injustices of South Africa’s past is unique to South 
Africa, yet it may be equally difficult to achieve this without any cost to efficiency, 
especially in the short term.312
      According to Eleanor Fox, if expectations are high that South Africa’s new 
competition law will visibly change the terms of economic participation in favour of 
the historically repressed black majority in South Africa, they are likely to be 
unfulfilled.
 Nevertheless, the Act does not give South African 
competition lawyers a choice but to grapple with a multitude of goals.  
313 The statutory endorsement of both efficiency and equitable goals 
means that South Africa has to be cautious of foreign and especially American 
authorities that regard efficiency as the only goal of competition law.314
 
 
                                                          
309 Section 2 of the Competition Act. 
310 Ibid. 
311 Ibid. 
312 Ibid. 
313 Eleanor Fox ‘Equality, Discrimination, and Competition Law: Lessons from and for South Africa 
and Indonesia’ 2000 Harvard Intl Law Journal at pg 1 
314 Mondi Ltd/Kohler Cores and Tubes 20/CAC/Jun02 par 48. 
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      The focus on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is important against 
the background of the structure of the South African economy.315 High levels of 
concentration, and the conglomerate structure of business in many sectors from 
mining, to manufacturing and services, are important challenges for small business 
development in South Africa, besides the common challenges that SMEs face more 
generally.316 According to Hartzenberg, the conglomerate structure of business in 
South Africa and the strong vertical linkages that exist in many industries can prove 
to be effective barriers to entry for smaller enterprises.317 The goal of promotion of a 
greater spread of ownership, especially regarding historically disadvantaged persons, 
reflects the concerns about the unequal distribution of income and wealth in South 
Africa. South Africa for many decades was one of the most unequal distributions of 
income in the world, with strong racial lines affecting the distribution of income 
within the economy. Greater spread of ownership among the populace and the 
relevance of SMEs promoting equal distribution are deemed to be important to 
ensure longer-term balanced and sustainable development.318
      The Act’s preamble reverts to the political motivations behind the rationale for 
the policy reform process of the post apartheid government. The particular problems 
facing competition law and its effective enforcement, including practices, some of 
which were promoted and supported by apartheid policies and laws, led to high 
levels of concentration of ownership and control, inequitable constraints on 
economic participation by the majority of South Africans, and ineffective restraints 
on anti-competitive trade practices.
  
319 The Act articulates four pillars of public 
interest. These are small and medium enterprise development and black economic 
empowerment, employment, impact on a particular industry or region, and the ability 
of national industries to compete in international markets.320
                                                          
315 Trudi Hartzenberg ‘Competition Policy and Enterprise Development: The Role of Public Interest 
objectives in South Africa’s Competition Policy’ pg 12. 
 Perhaps the most 
distinctive pillar of the public interest in the South African competition legislation is 
empowering historically disadvantaged persons. The Competition Act, in this 
respect, echoes the focus in South Africa’s Constitution on full and equal enjoyment 
316 Ibid. 
317 Ibid. 
318 Ibid at pg 13. 
319 Ibid. 
320 Ibid at pg 31. 
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of all rights and freedoms, and enshrines the economic empowerment of black 
persons in South Africa in the Act.321
      Although the inclusion of public interest issues in the Competition Act has been 
criticised, their inclusion has to be read in context. Some of the major challenges to 
sustainable development in South Africa are job creation and black economic 
empowerment. Explicit reference to these factors is thus to be expected in a 
significant area of policy and law such as competition and in some sense, it provides 
a balance of considerations in the challenge to develop a set of complementary 
policies and laws to facilitate enterprise development and the achievement of broader 
socio-economic objectives.
  
322 Competition law is very instrumental for effective 
market governance. The rules of the market game that include competition rules can 
enhance market outcomes by promoting not only the achievement of efficiencies, but 
also greater equity.323
      With South Africa’s history, the inclusion of public interest concerns is 
justifiable. The nature of the South African economy, gross unequal distribution of 
income which ultimately results in the inequality of economic opportunity have to be 
addressed by a coherent set of policy initiatives.
 To this extent South Africa’s competition law is progressive in 
its explicit incorporation of public interest considerations; whereas even mature 
jurisdictions shy away from such potentially contentious territory.  
324
       The contribution of competition policy while in some cases being more indirect, 
can play an extremely important role in ensuring that SMEs, not only get access to 
specific market opportunities, but also do not fail because of anti-competitive 
practices.
 A challenging question is to what 
extent different policies can impact on the promotion of small and medium sized 
enterprises and in particular what specifically can be the contribution of competition 
law in this regard. 
325
                                                          
321 Hartzenberg (note 315) at pg 13. 
 Competition policy and the law which gives effect to this policy provide 
indispensable checks and balances to ensure that the market process works without 
being rigged by larger firms or firms that may have market power, which can be used 
322 Ibid. 
323Ibid. 
324 Ibid at pg 20. 
325 Ibid. 
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to the disadvantage of other market participants.326
      While it may be desirable to include public interest considerations explicitly to 
limit the scope of interpretation, care has to be taken both in the drafting of the law 
and in the implementation of that law. Efficiency and consistency in the 
implementation of competition law are very important advocacy tools in a 
developing country. There may be occasions where the promotion of public interest 
objectives will be better served by other policy interventions other than competition 
policy, and the competition authorities should be bold enough to hold back on 
interfering when such circumstances arise. 
 This does not mean that there 
should be no casualties of the market and the process of competition, but competition 
should be fair and without prejudice. 
      As stated earlier, the public interest objectives in South Africa are largely based 
on achieving equality and lessening of discrimination. It is therefore a valid exercise 
to ask if competition law can work as a means of advancing equality without 
substantially undermining market goals and without capture by private interests.327
      In spite of the multiple public interest aspirations of the Act, majority of the body 
of the statute reflects relatively well-tested principles of competition law as discussed 
in chapter 3. For example, anti-competitive agreements are forbidden unless their 
pro-competitive and efficiency gains outweigh the anti-competitive concerns.
 
328 
While the section concerning the abuse of dominance contains low market power 
thresholds, a firm can rebut the presumption by showing that it lacks market 
power.329 Furthermore, a dominant firm must not engage in specified exclusionary 
acts such as using leverage to sell products and refusing to supply scarce goods to a 
competitor. The respondent however, can defend its conduct by showing that the pro-
competitive and efficiency gains of its conduct outweigh the losses.330
                                                          
326 Ibid. 
 Dominant 
firms are prohibited also from engaging in price discrimination that is likely to 
substantially lessen competition. They can, however, use the usual defences of cost 
justification, meeting competition, and responding to changed market conditions 
327 Eleanor Fox (note 313). 
328 Chapter 2 of the Competition Act. 
329 S 7.  
330 S 8. 
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such as deteriorating perishable goods.331
      A clause that is significantly different from standard competition law is the 
clause stating that Competition Tribunal may exempt for up to five years agreements 
otherwise prohibited if they contribute to "promotion of the ability of small 
businesses or firms controlled or owned by historically disadvantaged persons, to 
become competitive."
 
332 The provisions allowing exemption for agreements that 
promote the competitiveness of firms owned or controlled by historically 
disadvantaged individuals reflect a bold approach. The concept is different in kind 
from mere prohibition of price discrimination and uses of leverage that block 
economic opportunity on the merits and even these prohibitions have fallen into 
disfavour under "efficiency antitrust."333
     According to Fox, the availability of exemption for certain agreements and 
mergers could imply that South Africans are sometimes willing to pay a supra-
competitive cartel price for goods and services as a cost of advancing the critical 
effort to bring more of the historically excluded population into the economic 
mainstream.
  
334 The Competition Tribunal is however not authorized to exempt an 
agreement unless the exemption is likely to help the recipients become more 
competitive for example, more efficient and effective in the marketplace.335 The 
small margins for the grant of exemptions are perhaps reserved for the gray area 
within which the competitive effects of an agreement are ambiguous. According to 
Fox, the South African legislators may have succeeded in doing what Waelbroeck 
recommends: allowing discrimination based on economic considerations where it 
helps, not hurts, the market.336
      The goals of equality and opportunity in the marketplace are often said to be 
inimical to competition and therefore not appropriate goals for a competition law.
 This result is made possible by the availability in the 
statute itself of pro-competitive justifications for anti competitive conducts. 
337
                                                          
331 S 9. 
 
Moreover, efficiency advocates assert that competition law is not a good tool to 
332 Competition Act of 1998. 
333 Eleanor Fox (note 313) at pg 4. 
334 Ibid.  
335 Ibid. 
336 Ibid. 
337 Eleanor Fox (note 313) at pg 7. 
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obtain economic equality.338 They claim that efficiency is seldom the objective of the 
legislators who enact competition laws; rather they focus on private power and how 
to contain its use and abuse.339 Proponents of competition law are usually 
entrepreneurs who want a fairer shot in the marketplace.340 Fox is of the opinion that 
the question of a competition law that favours the oppressed is not a question of why 
but why not.341
       As the South African background statements imply, an economy that has been 
run by an elite that has suppressed the majority, may be unable to meet its efficiency 
potential until a substantial level of equality in fact has been achieved. Until the 
previously disadvantaged participate fully in the economy and enjoy the benefits, the 
efficiency potential of the nation will remain a tall order. Also, for the competition 
law of a developing country, goals are more important than efficiency. Achieving a 
more equitable distribution of opportunity may be one of such goals and a nation 
should have the right to make this choice.  
 
      Also, the use of public interest considerations to allow SMEs greater access to 
specific markets is significant in showing that developing countries can use equitable 
distribution goals to combat exclusionary practices by dominant firms and promote 
fairer competition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
338 supra 
339 Ibid. 
340 Ibid. 
341 Ibid. 
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6. Conclusion 
      This paper started off by reviewing the relevance and advantages of competition 
law for developing economies. I was able to establish that despite the challenges that 
developing countries might encounter in implementing and giving effect to 
competition laws, the advantages of having such laws to combat anti-competitive 
practices outweigh the scepticisms against the effectiveness of the law. 
      I considered in detail exclusionary conduct in abuse of dominant positions by 
first discussing US competition law, in particular section 2 of the Sherman Act with 
regard to monopolization and attempt to monopolize cases. I discussed the three 
dominant tests that have been propounded in evaluating this area of law in the USA, 
which are the profit sacrifice, no economic sense and consumer welfare tests. I went 
on to discuss Art 82 of the European Commission Treaty with regard to abuse of 
dominant positions taking into consideration important case law that has emerged in 
the community and the structural analysis approach that was propounded in the 
Gyeselen paper.  
      I proceeded to discuss the similarities and differences between the US and EU 
approaches highlighting the significant differences that the EC does not punish 
attempts to attain a dominant position neither does it take intent into account unlike 
the US approach. In a final analysis on this section, I used refusal to deal cases 
especially the British Airways cases decided in both jurisdictions to make 
comparisons.  
      The Competition Act of South Africa was the next section that I dealt with taking 
a critical look at Section 8. I went into detailed discussions about the specific 
meanings of phrases used in the section and undertook a careful analysis of the 
Competition Commission v South African Airways case by placing into context my 
analysis under refusal to deal cases as well.  
      I came to the conclusion that given the proposed tests under the American 
approach and the position adopted under the EC, it appears that South Africa has 
opted for a hybrid approach to dealing with exclusionary conduct under abuse of 
dominance without taking an exclusive position on proof of adverse effect or 
likelihood of foreclosing competition. I submitted that such an approach is simply 
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not favourable for developing economies as it allows the possibility of dominant 
firms getting away with exclusionary practices in cases where a Court is successfully 
convinced that the facts of a particular case warrant adopting the approach of proof 
of adverse effect to the consumer to the detriment of the objectives of the 
Competition Act which favours consumer welfare and protection.  
      The next section in this paper took a look at the extraterritorial application of 
competition law. I did so in order to evaluate the practical application of the 
competition rules earlier discussed in developing countries that have not enacted 
competition legislation. I evaluated both the US and EC approaches to 
extraterritoriality using case law to decipher the various approaches. The objective of 
this analysis was to lay a foundation to make a case for the regulation of competition 
law on a regional level which will have the effect of such law being implemented and 
applicable extraterritorially. I used the COMESA Competition Regulation as a case 
study to make recommendations that where competition law is adopted on a regional 
level, the implementation of the laws should be overseen by a commission with supra 
national authority and should also engage in a process of mandatory conciliation 
before arbitration in cases where State policies differ to enhance better cooperation 
among States on competition matters. I also suggested that the effects doctrine which 
has not been expressly adopted under the EC regime will be instrumental in 
successfully pursuing competition regulation on a regional level in Africa. 
      Finally, I placed my overall discussion into perspective by looking at the effect of 
public interest in combating exclusionary practices in developing economies. I used 
South Africa as a case study to determine whether it is indeed possible to balance 
typical competition law objectives of efficiency and equitable goals that a developing 
economy is most likely inclined to pursue when enacting competition laws. I came to 
the conclusion that while balancing these two objectives may be difficult in practice, 
pursuing equitable goals rather than efficiency through competition law does not 
undermine the effectiveness of the law to police anti-competitive practices. 
      I hope that this dissertation will be a useful contribution to the various campaigns 
and advocacy across Africa for the regulation of cartels and dominant firms through 
competition law. 
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